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It is a well-known fact of literary history, that between the
Renaissance and the Romantic period, a radical change took place in the
manner in which poets and literary critics conceived of the faculty
and function of imagination and its role in the poetic process. Put
briefly and over-simply, it was a change from a concept of imagination
as a begetter of visual images, an instrument of dreams, fiction, and
poetic diversion, to one in which this faculty came to be considered
as not only a creative one, but also an 'organ of truth I, so to speak,
whose visions, insights, and illuminations possessed unquestioned
validity.
This paper attempts to trace the historical steps by which
this change occurred, and to examine the major differences between the
way the imagination was conceived of in Romantic theory and criticism,
as compared with prevailing conceptions among earlier theorists.
I believe this change in the concept of the poetic imagination
to be an important distinguishing characteristic between the poetry of
the English Romantics and that of Renaissance and Neoclassicism. In
my focus on seminal writers whose views helped bring about this change,
I have kept in mind the two-fold question: What is poetry? What is
its relation to reality?
Three distinct answers emerge in this historical search.
Briefly stated, a view of Renaissance poetry emerges which sees poetry
as being I fictional' in nature. The Renaissance theorist does not
ii
conceive of the imagination as a faculty which portrays reality .
Neoclassic theory, the poet and critic are seen to refer poetry
directly to the reason, rather than to the imaginative faculty. They
attempt to portray empirical truth in their poetry. In doing so,
imagination becomes "the dress of thought" , the faculty of "adornment".
In Romantic theory, on the other hand , one sees emerging a
new concept of imagination. Here , the poet and critic believe that
poetry refers directly to the imagination . Consequently , the imaginative
faculty becomes , in Romanticism , the mo s t vital agent in poetic com-
position , thought to be capable of presenting truth of a much higher
nature than that which could be ascertained through the exercise of
reason and the senses. It becomes the only sure way of arriving at
truth.
These three distinct views of the nature of poetry and its
relation to reality characterize English literary criticism between the
sixt.eenth and early nineteenth centuries, and have a direct bearing on
the developing concept of the faculty and function of imagination .
They provide valuable insights into the way imagination was seen to
operate ; consequently , they form the foundation on which I build my
case for imagination 's changing role .
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INTRODUCTION
Boswell: "Then, Sir, what is poetry?"
Johnson: "Why, Sir, it is much easier to
say what it is not. We all know
what light is; but it is not----ea;y
to tell what it is.
A study of the changing concept of the faculty and function
of imagination in English literary criticism is a study of the
various attempts by poets and critics to explain the nature of
poetry in terms of the mental processes involved in its creation .
One of the earliest attempts by any critic to give a full account
of Elizabethan literary theory was made by Philip Sidney. In his
treatise , A Defence of Poetry, Sidney states :
Poesy therefore is an art of imitation, for so Aristotle termeth
it in the word ( mimesi~ --that is to say, a representing ,
counterfeiting , or figuring forth--to speak metaphorically ,
a speaking picture--with this end, to teach and delight . 1
Sidney understood the nature of poetry to be fictional. This was the
view shared by Bacon and by Renaissance theorists in general who
conceived of poetry as the product of the imagination , that is, a product
ISir Philip Sidney, A Defence of Poetry , ed. Jan Van Dorsten
(Oxford: University Press, 1973), p. 25.
of "fiction". The exercise of imagination, in Renaissance theory,
could never depict reality. Only through the exercise of reason could
man arrive at truth. Poetry was far removed from truth.
Renaissance theorists valued the imagination, but they never
thought that it represented, let alone comprehended, the 'truth of
things'. The poet "nothing affirms", Sidney's criticism echoes. 2
finds a similar view in Bacon's critical theory: poetry constitutes
nothing more than pleasurable fiction.
with the influence of Hobbes on the development of Neoclassical
thought, poetry came to be understood as having a direct relation to
reality. The substance of poetry came to be regarded as truth, that
is, the truth which derives from the workings of reason and the judgment.
For the Neoclassical theorist, poetry was not the product of the
imagination; rather , it referred directly to the reason. Consequently,
his view of imagination was that it provided poetry with its ornaments
which, though pleasurable and helpful, were not of the essence of
poetry. Within the scope of such a theory, the imaginative faculty is
an adorning, rather than a truth-giving one.
It is with the emergence of Blake, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and
the other major Romantic poets , that one sees a change in the attitude
toward the faculty and function of imagination. This faculty now
begins to assume new and major proportions in the composition of
poetry and its relation to reality. The substance of poetry comes to
2A Defence of Poetry, p. 52 .
be regarded as truth , but truth of a higher form than that which
derives from the perception of the senses and the workings of the dis-
cursive intellect . Insight and imagination become inseparable.
Poetry , because it is the product of imagination, is now thought to be
capable of presenting reality of a higher validity than empirical
reality. The power of imagination is now considered to be a higher power
than that of the discursive reason or of the senses.
One sees in Romantic criticism a concept of i magination that
is in many respects revolutionary. One of its most striking features
is the belief in the power of imagination to transform anew the world
and all that it contains . This new world constitutes for the Romantic
poet an important kind of truth . Here one sees the Romantic as standing
on new ground: imagination and truth are being brought into closer
harmony than ever before . \'l/hereas in pre-Romantic criticism the
imagination was commonly held to be merely a picture-making faculty ,
in Romanticism it is being conceived of as the power of the human mind
to fashion its own vision of reality through the exercise of poetic
powers. These powers are born, not of ratiocination , but of inspired
imagination. Therefore , since Romantic poetry is the product of
imagination , it constitutes a higher form of truth than that ascertained
through reason or the senses. For the Romantic theorist and poet ,
reason of i tsel f is not enough; it needs the stimulus of "y oun g
imagination" to "e l e v a t e the more-than-reasoning Mind". 3
3William Wordsworth , "Miscellaneous Sonnets" , in Wordsworth I s
Poetical Works , eds. E. De Selincourt and Helen Darbishire (Oxford :
Clarendon Press , 1946) , Vol. 3, Sonnet XXV, p . 20.
Romantic criticism views the poetic imagination as a
collaborator with the Godhead in recreating the world. This implies,
in Coleridge's literary theory, that the poet possesses the power within
his own mind to bring order and shape into the confusing world of raw
sensation . The poetic imagination- -an echo of the infinite I Am--takes
the perceptions of sensory experience and recreates them into other
forms. This creative activity of the poetic imagination , because it
partakes of the Divine power , assumes , then , an essential connection
with life, with the truth of things. This is a tremendous claim, not
confined to Coleridge , but held in varying degrees by Blake ,
Wordsworth, Shelley , Keats and others.
Blake speaks with apocalyptic certainty about the divinity
of the imagination , and holds the view that through the exercise of
this faculty, man ' s spiritual nature is realized. Neither Coleridge
nor Wordsworth take the concept of imagination that far. However, it
does assume for them prime importance. They , too , believe that
through this creative activity , this power like unto God's, man can
find meaning for his existence. It is the very task of poetry to
explain life's mysteries .
These poets are alike in re j ecting Locke 's theory of mind.
For Blake "mental things" alone are real. Coleridge expressly rejects
Locke's theory also , but for different reasons . Mind , for Coleridge ,
is not passive; it is made in God 's image. Therefore, any system
built on the passiveness of mind must , in his view, be a false system.
What the Romantics are doing is preparing the way for the
restoration of a supremacy of spirit which Locke's philosophy and
Newton 's Science had denied. Things of the spirit concern the Romantics.
They believe that through imagination and inspired insight , this world
can be interpreted and presented in their poetry.
Through visible things , Blake reaches a transcendent state
of ' e t e r n i t y' . His whole attention is turned toward an ideal ,
spiri tual world. Coleridge and Wordsworth are fully aware of the
" i n a n i ma t e , cold world " in which objects "~ ob j e cts, are essentially
fixed and dead" .4 But they believe that the poet 's task is to bring
to life the known and the familiar , to " g i ve the charm of novelty to
things of every day". 5
4sarnuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (London: J . M.
Dent & Sons Ltd. , 1934), Ch . Xlll , p . 160 .
5 I b i d ., cn, XlV, p. 161.
Prevailing Renaissance Views
One of the earliest works of English literary criticism is
Sidney's A Defence of Poetry. This treatise, one of the first on the
part of any Renaissance critic to argue on the side of poetry against
those in his time who stressed its dangers, affords invaluable insights
into the way imagination was thought to function in Renaissance
poetry.
Sidney puts forth very seriously his claim for poetry as
being "the first light-giver to ignorance". 1 Among the Romans, he
states, the poet was held to be a "prophet"; among the Greeks, a
"maker". Poetry, confirms Sidney, bears analogy with the works of the
heavenly Maker:
. . . who having made man to His own likeness, set him
beyond and over all the works of that second nature: which in
nothing he showeth so much as in poetry, when wi th the force
of a divine breath he bringeth things forth surpassing her
doings--with no small arguments to the credulous of that first
accursed fall of Adam, since our erected wit maketh us know
what perfection i~, and yet our infected will keepeth us from
reaching unto it.
Proceeding as it does from an enlightened intellect, and
aiming to recover something of that which was lost in man's accursed
Fall, poetry, in Sidney's view, bears analogy with the works of the
lA Defence of Poetry, p. 18.
2I b i d., pp. 24-25.
divine Creator.
The English have met with the Greeks, states Sidney, in
calling the poet a "maker". Yet, one asks, in what manner does the
Renaissance poet create? He does so, in Sidney I s theory of poetry,
by improving on nature:
The physician weigheth the nature of man I s body, and the nature
of things helpful or hurtful unto it. And the metaphysic,
though it be in the second and abstract notions, and therefore
be counted supernatural, yet doth he indeed build upon the
depth of nature. Only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any
such subjection, lifted up with the vigour of his own invention,
doth grow in effect another nature, in making things either
better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such
as never were in nature, as the Heroes, Demigods, Cyclops,
Chimeras, Furies, and such like. . . .3
Sidney I s point is this: the poet, through "the force of a
divine breath", brings forth things far surpassing nature's doings.
first sight, this may appear to be a championing of imagination,
an even somewhat innovative theory--one which anticipates the concept of
the creative imagination developed centuries later by Coleridge. It
must be noted at this point, however, that one ought not read into
Sidney's theory any greater role for the poetic imagination than that
which remains implicit in his defini tion of poetry in general:
Poesy therefore is an art of imitation, for so Aristotle t e rme t.r,
it in the word (rnimesisJ--that is to say, a representing,
counterfeiting, or figuring forth--to speak metaphorically, a
speaking picture--with this end, to teach and delight. 4
It must b e emphasized that when Sidney uses the term "creator", he
3A Defence of Poetry, p. 23.
4 I b i d., p. 25.
means it in the sense implied in this defini tion. The poet's art is
the art of "imitation", the "feigning" of notable images of virtues
and vices, for the express purpose of "teaching delightfully". On
this point Sidney's Defence stands firm. Right poets are those who
imitate both to delight and teach and to move men to goodness .
Does Sidney tell us that his poetic creation is a form of
truth? "Now, for the poet , he nothing affirms , and therefore never
lieth" . 5 Al though the poet may extend nature 's bounds through the
force of his wit , he makes no demands for the truth of his poetic
creation. There is not the intimation here that the poet creates what
he believes to be the real world , such as one finds in Romantic theory .
On the contrary, the effect remains fictional invention and is to be
accepted as such:
The poet never maketh any circles about your imagination, to
conjure you to believe for true what he wri tes. He citeth not
authorities of other histories, but even for his entry
calleth the sweet Muses to inspire into him a good invention;
in truth , not labouring to tell you what is or is not , but
wha t should or should not be. And there fore , though he recount
things not true , yet because he telleth them not for true , he
lieth not. . . 6
It must be pointed out that imp l i c i t in Sidney 's theory is
the view that poetry must have a moral aim . Consequently , poetry must
be audience-oriented. It must aim to achieve definite responses in the
reader--moral betterment , in other words. This view of poetry has its
5A Defence of Poetry, p. 52.
6 I b i d., pp. 52 -53.
origin in the classical theory of rhetoric where , in Horace 's Ars
Poetica , to use one example, the reader often receives a clear statement
that the poet I s aim is to teach and to please, as well as to move the
audience . Thus Sidney was voicing the sentiments of his contemporaries
when he wrote of " e ve r - p r a i s ewo r t hy Poesy . . . full of virtue-breeding
delightfulness, and void of no gift that ought to be in the noble name
of learning ". 7 As an instructor in the way of virtue , the poet excelled
both the historian and the philosopher by "s e t t i n g out virtue in her
best colours"; by not only "furnishing the mind with knowledge,
but in setting it forward to that which deserveth to be called and
accoun ted good ". 8
The moral aim was considered to be part of poetry I s essential
requirements. A still more generalized Renaissance doctrine implicit
in Sidney 's Defence , and one more significant to the concept of imagina-
tion in Renaissance criticism , is the view of the poet as "maker" .
"Lifted up with the vigour of his own invention " , Sidney writes , the
poet " do t h grow in effect another nature, in making things either
better than nature bringeth forth, or , quite anew , forms such as never
were in nature". 9 Th i s is none other than the Aristotelian concept of
ideal imitation. Art finishes the job when nature fails. Or , as Sidney
puts it:
Nature never set forth the earth in so rich tapestry as diverse
poets have done; neither with so pleasant rivers, fruitful
7A Defence of Poetry , p . 74.
8 I b i d., p. 38.
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trees , sweet-smelling flowers , nor whatsoever else may make
the too much loved earth more 10YOly. Her world is brazen,
the poets only deliver a golden.
In exceeding nature 's bounds, then, the poet " go e t h hand in hand with
nature , not enclosed within the narrow warrant of her gifts , but freely
ranging within the zodiac of his own wit " . 11 By this activity of
"freely ranging wi thin the zodiac of his own wit ", as Sidney expresses
i t h e r e, the poetic imagination brings forth forms such as ne ver were
in nature. Th is notion is inherent in Shakespeare ' s A MidS ummer -Night ' s_
Dream , one might observe:
And as imagination bodies forth
The form of things unknown , the poet 's pen
~U~:~a~h~~~~a~~~~e:~da:dn~~:~I2to airy nothing
By exercising his po wers of invention so as to delight the r e a d e r, the
poet fulfills the very end of poetry in Renaissance theory.
Such poetic theory makes no allowance for interaction between
the poet and the object of his perception , as does Romantic theory .
Renaissance poetry is content to contemplate the human pageant in a
manner that satisfies the taste of its audience. Such a concept of the
imagination and its relation to reality seems strikingly different
from that of the Romantic poet for whom the imaginative faculty carne
to mean an agent of profound and penetrating insight , a " s y n t h e t i c and
lOA Defence of Poetry , p. 24 .
llIbid .
12william Shakespeare, A MidSummer-Night I s Dream, ed . A. Wilson
verity (4th ed . , Cambridge : University Press, 18 94), v . i , 60 -61.
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magical power", as Coleridge expressed it, through which the artist
unified into an organic whole the diverse elements of the universe.
Sidney never took the notion of the imagination that far. Although his
poet offered a "golden world" , the result was still fictional :
And therefore, as in history, looking for truth, they may go
away full fraught with falsehood , so in poesy , looking but
for fiction , they shall use the narration but as an imaginative
ground-plot of a profitable invention . 1 3
To speak of a concept of imagination in Renaissance literature
as portrayed in Sidney's criticism, then, is to interpret imagination as
an agent, a 'contriver ', through the exercise of which a poet conjured
up his poem out of his storehouse of mental images. One sees the poet
as a poet of invention.
Imagination is certainly given an important role in Renaissance
poetic theory , one must add . When , for instance , "with the force of a
divine breath" the poet brings forth things far surpassing nature , he
appears almost to anticipate the role which the Romantic poet attributed
to imagination . One must caution , however, that when Sidney speaks of
the imagination, he is closer to the Aristotelian concept of ' i mi t a t i o n '
than to the Romantic concept of ' i ma g i n a t i on' . Imitation for Sidney,
as it was for Aristotle , constituted the art of 'becoming ' , the art of
going beyond what nature had achieved . But it was still a world of
fiction which was created. Sidney never went so far as to intimate
13 A Defence of Poetry, p. 53.
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that what the poet portrayed was anything more than invention . "The
poet never maketh any circles about your imagination , to conjure you
to believe for true what he writes". Imagination merely "bodies
forth" the form of things unknown , and these forms, made incarnate by
the poet's pen, were not to be interpreted as visions of a higher truth.
The poet nothing affirms, Sidney 's criticism echoed. If , in the
exercise of his wit, the poet exceeded nature for the express purpose of
achieving delight , one accepted his product for what he conceived it to
be , a work of i magination , a produc t of fiction--a work of pleasurable
imitation ranging as wide as the poetic imagination carried it--nothing
Likewise, Bacon , in his Advancement of Learning , referred to
poetry as " f e i g ne d history". In his view , the events of ordinary
history did not of themselves contain a sufficient degree of greatness
or moral certitude to satisfy man I s longing for transcendence , so
"poesy feigns acts and events greater and more heroical", 14 enduing
them "with more rareness, and more unexpected and alternative variations"
than that found in nature.
Poetry 's aim in Bacon 's theory of knowledge was to " f e i gn "
a more perfect order . This brought pleasure , and fulfilled ma n I s
desire for what Bacon referred to as "ma gn a n i mi t y, morality and
delectation", because the human understanding, of its very nature,
14Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning, Book II , in The Works
of Francis Bacon , eds. James Spedding , Robert L. Ellis, and Douglas D.
Heath (Bo s t o n : Taggard and Thompson, 1968 ) , Vol. VI , p. 203.
lSIbid .
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stated Bacon in his discussion of the four classes of Idols,
more order and regularity than it finds in the world and, therefore ,
fabricates it:
The human understanding is of its own nature prone to suppose
the existence of more order and regularity in the world than
it finds . And though there be many things in nature which
are singular and unmatched, yet it devises for them parallels
and conjugates and relatives which do not exist. 1 6
In the Baconian context, the poet may be seen to be "an ingenious
liar" . Indeed , in one of his essays, " Of Truth", Bacon stated:
A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt ,
that if there were taken out of men 's minds vain opinions,
flattering hopes, false valuations , imaginations as one would ,
and the like , but it wo u l d leave the minds of a number of men
poor shrunken things , full of melancholy and indisposition
and unpleasing to t.hemae Lve s ? One of the Fathers , in great
severity, called poesy vinum daemonum [ devil ' s -wineJ, because
it filleth the imagination; and yet it is but with the shadow of
a lie. But it is not the lie that passeth through the mind ,
but the lie that sinketh in and settleth in it, that doth the
hurt... 17
Bacon 's theory of knowledge would include poetry among those Idols which
have found their way into men 's minds, and which represent "wo r l d s of
their own creation after an unreal and scenic fiction". 18 It springs
from the imagination , a faculty which Bacon described in these terms :
. . . this Janus of Imagination hath differing faces; for
the face towards Reason hath the print of Truth, but the face
towards Action hath the print of Good; which neY9rtheless are
faces , Quales decet esse sororum [jister-faces] .
16"Aphorisms", in The Works of Francis Bacon , Vol. Vlll, p . 79.
17
"Essays or Counsels", in The Works , Vol. Xll, 82 .
18"Aphorisms", Vlll, 78.
19Advancement of Learning , Vl, p. 258.
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Acting as a nuncias between the intellectual and the appetitive soul of
man, imagination is seen to serve both. But is it a reliable agent,
one asks? Bacon paints it as a two-faced figure, looking at the same
time toward reason and toward action. It cannot be depended upon to
portray truth . Indeed, the imagination may at pleasure "make unlawful
matches and divorces of things" precisely because it is not tied to the
laws of matter. Reason alone can give assurance of reality: the
imagination merely "submits the show of things" to the desires of the
mind .
In Baconian criticism , the imaginative faculty is seen to be an
untrustworthy agent. Divorced from reason, it forms relatives and
parallels where none exist. Bacon considers this faculty to be as
falsely pernicious as the inhabitants of Plato 's Cave . For , far from
resembling a clear and equal glass, the mind of man which begets imagina-
tions more truly resembles an enchanted glass, full of superstitions and
impostures:
. the spirit of man (according as it is meted out to
different individuals ) is in fact a thing variable and full of
perturbation, and governed as it were by chance. 20
In the same vein , he also wri tes :
. . . generally , let every student of nature take this as a
rule--that whatever his mind seizes and dwells upon with
peculiar satisfaction is to be held in suspicion. 21
20" Aphorisms" , in The Works of Francis Bacon, VIII , 77.
21 I b i d ., 86 .
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Such a view offers striking contrast to Wordsworth I s thinking, as
expressed in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800), wherein he speaks
of having
. a deep impression of certain inherent and indestructible
qualities of the human mind, and likewise of certain powers in
the great and permanent objects that act2~pon it which are
equally inherent and indestructible . . .
Such qualities are in direct relation to truth , in Wordsworth I s view of
poetry . The true province of the poet , he later relates , is not to
grope about in the external world for an assurance that an object is
sublime or beautiful, but to look into his own mind for this knowledge.
The Baconian concept of poetry, in a more positive context , does
raise man I s spirit and make it aware of a more perfect order than that
found in the imperfect order of things . This has reference to man I s
search for a more perfect "mo r a l order", or, as Sidney defines it, a
"more exact goodness". Poetry supplies the shadows where the substance
is not to be found, and in so doing, raises man I s mind toward good
deeds. One must rightly conclude from Bacon's theory of knowledge , how-
ever, that poetry offers nothing more than fictional satisfactions.
is not to be taken seriously.
Poetry is feigned his tory, in other words, a pleasure or play
of the imagination, not a work or duty. It springs from that "J a nu s of
22william Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800), in
The Prose Works of William Wordsworth , eds. W. J. B . Owen and J. W.
Smyser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), Vol. 1, p . 130.
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imagination", that two-faced agent depicted by Bacon to be an agent
of deception. One is not surprised, therefore, at Bacon's mild warning
in Book II of the Advancement of Learning that " ... it is not good
to stay too long in the theatre".23
23Advancement of Learning in The Works of Francis Bacon, Vl,
206.
Seventeenth-Century Influences
The imagination , although it was held to b e the source of all
that was fruitful in seventeenth-century cri ticism, was thought to need
the check of judgment so that the poet did not fall into the trap of
over-luxuriance . One reason for this restraint upon the imagination may
be attrib uted to an age- o ld association of im a gin a tio n with the n on -
rational part of man. Imaginative phantasies were long considered to
have been begotten by the passions , or that ' n a t u r a l' part of man .
Subj ect e ven to the devil ' s promptings , i magination wa s regarded as a
faculty to be controlled . Milton, in his Paradise Los t , for example ,
depicts Eve 's temptation by Satan through a dream :
Squat like a toad , close at the ear of Eve;
Assaying by his devilish art to reach
The organs of her fancy , and with them forge
Illusions as he list , phantasms and dreams..
Mil ton makes no distinction between imagination and fancy, nor
do most writers of his t ime . One thing is clear , however : imagination
is n o more val i d an o rgan of truth in Mil ton I s v iew than in Bacon 's
theory of poetry . It is a whims ical , capricious facul ty , waking up
when reason goes to sleep , and , unchecked by reason , imitating her by
1John Mil ton , Paradise Lost in James Holly Hanford, ed . , The
Poems of John Milton (2nd ed . , New York : The Ronald Press companY:-1953 ) ,
l V, 800-3.
18
"misjoining shapes". 2
The imaginative faculty is no more capable of depicting reality
for Mil ton than dreams are. In this regard he appears to be close to
the psychological temper of his age which often held that the imaginative
faculty could be a delusive , if not a dangerous one. Critics have
indeed attested to a certain distrust of imagination in the intellectual
background of the seventeenth century. It was an age wherein scientific
truth constituted the greatest goal to be attained in prose; an age
wherein the imaginative faculty, traditionally allied with the passions
and with the making of ' i ma ge s' , was often regarded with suspicion.
Without the check imposed by the judgment, imagination could lead the
poet into endless digressions and toward an over-abundance of imagery.
It could also lead to a lack of discernment between that which was
fi tting to be said, and that which ought to be passed over, as one
eighteenth-century writer expressed it:
When the Imagination and Invention are so busy , Reason and
Judgment are seldom allowed Time enough to examine the
Justness of a Sentiment and the Conclusiveness of an Argument.
Many of our own Poets , the most celebrated for their Ingenuity,
have been very incorrect and injudicious , as well as irreligious
and immoral, in their Sentiments. They seem to have studied
rather to say fine things than just ones , and have often shown
their Fancy atili; Expense of their Understanding , which is
buying Reputation at a very extravagant Price. 3
One begins to detect amid seventeenth-century emphases,
2paradise Lost, V, Ill.
3weekly Miscellany (Sept. 28, 1734 ), in Gentleman 's Magazine ,
IV (Sept. 1734) , 499 , and quoted by Donald F . Bond , '''Distrust ' of
Imagination in English Neo-Classicism" in Philological Quarterly,
XIV, 1 , January 1935.
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particularly the new Scientific mentality of which Bacon was a herald,
imagination 's low profile . Studies in literary criticism point to
sufficient evidence of the critics I warnings of the ills of too great
a license in the use of this facul ty . True , the criticism came down
more heavily on imaginative license in intellectual literature such as
philosophy, science, and the more serious prose writings , than in
poetry. Yet , truth was fast coming to be regarded as the exclusive
possession of science. Therefore , because the poetic imagination was
not considered to be the organ of truth, and since its fruits were
held to be false and chimerical and not to be taken seriously, poets
were often regarded as makers of "sugared trifles".
Sprat I S brief attention to poetry in his History of the Royal
Society gives certain credence to one I s suspicions that the seventeenth
century did little to enhance the status of poetry , and consequently
of the poetic imagination. Sprat I s expressed opinion of the poets was
that they were a pleasant but an unprofitable sort of men who might
well benefit from the new philosophy of his day. He was quite strong
in denouncing the wit and fables and religions of the ancient world
which had , in his opinion , outlived their usefulness as sources of
poetic imagery :
They have already serv ' d the Poets long enough ; and it is
now high time to dismiss them; especially seeing they have
this peculiar imperfection, that they were only Fictions at
first; whereas Truth is never so well express 'd or amplify 'd
as by those Ornaments which are True and Real in themselves. 4
4Thomas Sprat , History of the Royal Society , eds. Jackson I.
Cope and Harold Whitmore Jones (St . Louis: Washington University
Studies, 1959), Chap. XXXV, p . 414.
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Having postulated the works of nature as one of the best
and most fruitful soils for the growth of wit , Sprat advocated for
the poets the use of experiments in acquiring natural knowledge in the
manner set by Bacon who , Sprat wrote , "was abundantly recompenc ' d. .
by a vast Treasure of admirable Imaginations which it afforded him ,
wherewith to express and adorn his thoughts .. . " 5 The very motto of
the Royal Society itself , "On the word of No One " , gives evidence of
an increasing skepticism in p ure a priori reasoning and traditional
beliets- -symptomatic of the gradual change taking place in seventeenth-
century attitudes toward man , the world and the universe . Th e medieval
synthesis, that "circle of perfection " from which man had for so long
deduced his aesthetics and his ethics , was beginning to be broken , and
a mechanistic world responsive to nature 's laws was beginning to re-
place the animate , orderly world of sixteenth-century inheritance. The
geocosm-microcosm analogy which had inspired the imagination of poets
for centuries was losing its hold. Science was proving that things
were not what they seemed to be. The telescope , one of the most
significant of seventeentn-century inventions , for example , was dis -
covering new stars in the heavens. Surely this new knowledge of the
real nature of a universe which for so long had remaineci. mysterious
was not without its effect upon literature. As one critic expressed it :
The mathematical diagram more and more was taking the place of the full
image with all its varieties and suggestions of content, " a nd the
world was becoming a larger , a surer , a clearer , but also a less varied
SHistory of the Royal Society , p. 416.
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and less my s t e rio u s p lace " . 6
Evidence of this seeming disproportion between the old and
new cosmology is reflected , for instance, in John Donne 's poems ,
particularly in " Th e first Anniversary" :
And new Philosophy calls all in doubt ,
The Element of fire is quite put out ;
The Sun is lost , and th I earth , and no man I s wit
Can well direct him where to looke for it. 7
The new currents of thought resulting from the teachings of
Copernicus , Gilbert , Galileo , Descartes and Newton we r e soon to be
reflected in poetry and in the concept of the poetic imagination .
Already in the poetry of Donne and the metaphysicals , something of
their influence can be seen . For one thing , the swirl of conflicting
forces i n t e n s i f i e d the I intellectualism I implicit in their poetry.
Especially in the poetry of Donne does the poetic imagination draw upon
an ever-widening field of experience and this he commun icated with a
great deal of emotion . One notices , however , that this emotion is
always subservient to the logical faculty which predominates in his
poems. The expression of thought is paramount , rather than , say ,
creative fancy. One could infer that met~physical poetry is determined
logically ; its emotion arises from a joy in the triumph of reason,
rather than any other inherent quality .
6Helen C. White , The Metaphysical Poets : A Study in Religious
Experience (New York: The MacMillan Comp~ny, 1956), p . 39.
7John Donne , " Th e first Anniversary" , in The Poems of John
Donne, ed . , Herbert J . C. Grierson (London: Oxford University Press,
195i), I , 205-8 .
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In general , the seventeenth century may be conceived to have
been an age which, in its philosophical quest for truth, arrived at
the certainty that truth could best be expressed mathematically. As
for the faculty of imagination, it was not seen as a faculty operating
within truth I s domain . In fact, several influences at work in the
seventeenth century seemed to c reate a somewhat hardening of attitudes
against the poetic imagination . Bacon , we may recall, had already
disassociated literature from science , relegating poetry to the unreal
world of fancy, and positing truth and reality in science I s domain.
"Render to faith the things that are faith ' s" , he had heralded. The
Royal Society furthered this quest for mathematical certainty ,
declaring a veritable war on the poetic imagination:
The Poets began of old to impose the decei t . They, to make
a ll things look more venerable than they were , devis ' d a
thousand false ch imeras ; on every Field , River , Grove , and
~~::~ ::~ ~:~~~'~h: :~~~:~m.o~8their own making: With
setting out to rid itself of what it considered the errors
inheri ted from antiquity , the Society resolved to :::-Estore the truths
that had lain neglected . They did this by attempting " t o separate the
knowledge of Nature, from the colours of Fheto;rick, the devi.ce s of
Fancy, or the delightful decei 1: of Fables". 9 In their efforts t o
establish a language and style of precise denotation that could best serve
8History of the Royal Society , p. 340.
9 I b i d., p. 62 .
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science, the Society stripped imagination of metaphor, all in the
name of the new philosophy which , declared Sprat, had nothing in
common with the " t ho u s a nd false chimeras" on which the poets had
bestowed a phantasy of their own making. Who can fathom, warned
Sprat , how much uncertainty these "specious Tropes and Figures" have
created in the field of knowledge. "Of all the studies of men, nothing
may be sooner obtain' d , than this vicious abundance of Phrase , this
trick of Metaphors . . . which makes so great a noise . . . ,,1 0
This growing disposition to accept the scientific world picture
as the only true one was reinforced by Cartesian philosophy which set
up criteria for truth that made the mathematical properties of objects
the only real ones. Poetry, however , springs from other modes of
knowing ; thus , the Cartesian spirit had little in common with the
poetic spirit. The poets who followed Descartes could not be regarded
as writing with the conviction that what they imagined was true, when
the poetic imagination was thought to be incapable of producing anything
more valid than a fanciful invention. The purpose of poetry, it was
thought, was to convey pleasures, to depict pleasant pictures and
agreeable visions . The poetic imagination, because it was not thought
to be conformable to reason, could hardly be taken seriously . All it
could be expected to do was to cater to delight , to provide embellish-
ments which might be agreeable to the fancy. These fantasies, however,
were recognized by the judgment as having no relation with reality .
The poets wrote with a sense that their constructions were not true.
10History of the Royal Society, p. 112.
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One might again say that the exercise of the poetic imagination pro-
duced " i n ge n i ous lies".
In Hobbes 's criticism , however, one notices that the criterion
of truth ~ invoked. In his Answer to Davenant, the truth of passion
is stated as be ing p re fe r ab Le to the truth of fact . Hobbes dissents
from those who thought that "the Beauty of a Poeme consisteth in the
exorbitancy of the fiction . For as truth is the bound of Historicall ,
so the Resemblance of truth is the utmost limit of Poetical Liberty". 11
The faculty of imagination is depicted somewhat like an antenna
whereby new ideas can reach the mi nd ; it is like an explorer, swiftly
ranging over the materials of memory and forming new combinations :
Whereby the Fancy , when any worke of Art is to be performed,
finds her materials at hand and prepared for use , and needs
no more than a swift motion over them , that what she wa~ts ,
and is there to be had, may not lye too long unespied . l
Nevertheless , Hobbes insists on control , and on the necessity
of the judgment to check the exorbitancy of the imaginative faculty .
O~.lis insistence constitutes his chief contribution to the aesthetics of
Neo -classicism:
. . . Judgment the severer Sister busieth her selfe i n grave
and rigide examination of all the parts of Nature , and in
registring by Letters13their order, causes , uses , differences
and resemblances. . .
IlllThe Answer of Mr. Hobbes to Sir William 0 ' Avenant ' s Preface
Before Gondibert", in David F. Gladish , ed ., Sir \'lilliam Davenant ' s
Gondibert (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) , p. 51.
12 I b i d., p. 49 .
13 I b i d.
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Hobbes speaks of "imagery discreetly ordered". Reason is assuredly at
the center; imagination is but a "decaying sense". In the Leviathan,
(Chapter 2) he uses the term in this context--one which became fairl y
common among English theorists:
... after the object is removed, or the e ye shut, we still
retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than
when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call imagination,
from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though
improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it
fancy; whi.ch signifies appearance, and is as proper to one
sense, as to another. Imagination therefore is nothing but
~;~:~~~;s~e~s~i4and is found in men, and many other living
In Hobbes I s scheme of things, the poet's aim is "To know well
and know much". Reason is at the center; without its c he c k , the
imaginative faculty is scarcely commendable. While not in active
rebellion against judgment, imagination must nonetheless remain subject
to judgment's control. It is only in the train of imaginations
regulated that a writer can put his thoughts in fresh and persuasive
terms. Guided and controlled by the judgment, the imaginative faculty
at work in poetry is a desirable quality. Hobbes considers it to be a
highly useful faculty in the poet's makeup. One sees his praise of
"controlled" imagination in the preface to his translation of the
Odyssey (1675):
For in Fancie [imagination] consisteth the Sublimity of a Poet,
which is that Poetical Fury which the Readers for the most part
call for. It flies abroad swiftly to fetch in both Matter and
14Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (7th pr.,
London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1970), p. 23.
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Words; but if there be not Discretion at home to distinguish
which are fit to be used and which not... their delight
and grace is lost. But if they be discreetly used, they are
greater ornaments of a Poem by much than any other .15
Hobbes states clearly that it is the " J u dgme n t " which "b e ge t s
the strength and structure " of a poem . "Fa n c y begets the ornaments " .16
Imagination gives embellishment : this is the point he makes in his
account of the poetic imagination in his Answer to Davenant. Poetry,
then , since it ought to be a representative of reality having truth as
its substance , cannot refer to the imagination; it refers , rather, to
reason or judgment. On this critical foundation Hobbes helps build the
Neo -classical theory of the poetic imagination and its relation to
reali ty. Nowhere is there in Hobbes I s theory a suggestion of a creative
faculty of imagination in the " Roman t i c " sense of that word . Hobbes
sees imagination as serving a rhetorical purpose. Its main function is
to dress thought in attractive language. As a form of memory , it can
enable t h e writer to render , out of his storehouse of images , new and
pleasant ideas . In the act of composition, the poet turns over these
images stored in the memory somewhat like a spaniel ranging the field
until he finds a scent . Dryden, we recall, in his preface to "Annu s
Mirabilis " (Th e Wonders of the Year 1666 ) , holds a similar view of
imagination :
The composition of all persons is, or ought to be , of wit , and
wit in the poet . .. is no other than the faculty of imagination
15Quoted from Donald F . Bond , "Psychology of the Imagination",
in A Journal of English Literary History, IV , December 1937, p . 260.
16Hobbes , Answer to D' Avenant, p . 49 .
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in the writer, which, like a nimble spaniel, beats over and
~~n~~t:~r~~t:~~17ieldof memory, till it springs the quarry
The Neo -classic poet was not expected to be original. He
was encouraged to sing in perfect full tone if he wished to profit or
to please , in conformity with the Horatian dictum: Aut prodesse volunt
aut delectare poetae.
In Locke's theory of knowledge, there emerged a concept of mind
which portrayed the poetic imagination as a passive receiver of ready-
made images. The mind mirrored what the senses provided. It was not
seen to be actively at work, fashioning its own experiences, such as
one finds in the criticism of Wordsworth and Coleridge . Intimations
of the Romantic concept of imagination may only validly be inferred
whenever one discovers prevailing concepts of the mind as an active
power , rather than a passive receiving agent.
Such a concept has its origin in Plotinian philosophy.
time to time in the course of literary criticism, echoes of this
philosophy emerge, remotely anticipating Romantic theories of imagina-
tion . It is a concept wherein man 's "inner sense" is highlighted:
All that one sees as a spectacle is still external ; one must
bring the vision within and see no longer in t h a t mode of
separation but as we know ourselves; thus a man filled with
a god--possessed by the Apollo or by one of the Muses--need
no longer look outside for his vision of the divine being;
it is but finding the strength to see divinity within .. . .
. . to see the divine as something external is to be
17 John Dryden, Preface to "Annus Mirabilis" in The Works of
John Dryden, eds., Edward Niles Hooker and H. T. Swedenberg, Jr.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), Vol. 1 , p . 53.
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outside of it; to become it is to be most truly in beauty!
since sight deals with the external there can here be no
vision unless in t.he sense of identification with the object.
And this identification amounts to a self-knowing, a self-
consciousness. . .10
The mind's analogy, in Plotinian philosophy, is that of a lamp
projecting a radiance out of its storehouse to the objects of sense.
Within the mind's activity an intellectual imagination plays its part ,
transforming those objects of visible sense :
. . . the quester.. . is lifted and sees, never knowing how;
the vision floods the eyes with light , but it is not a light
showing some other object , the light is itself the vision.
With this he himself becomes identical. 1 9
This analogy of the perceiving mind is echoed by the Romantic
poets . Wordsworth, in his Prelude, speaks of an auxiliary light , coming
from his "mind", bestowing new splendour on the setting sun. Coleridge
echoes somewhat similar thoughts in Chapter XV of his Biographia Literaria
when he speaks of the human and intellectual life that is transferred to
images from the poet 's own spirit. So too, in Plotinian philosophy, is
the power and activity of imagination a unifying, transforming one.
With Plotinus, the essence or character of an object is not in
the material; rather, it is in the designer even before it enters the
object, and it is there by virtue of his imagination. The beauty,
18plotinus, The Enneads , trans. Stephen MacKenna (London:
Faber and Faber Limi ted, 1956), V, 8, 431-2.
19 I b i d., Vl, 7, 590.
29
already comprehended in the artist I s imagination, goes out of him,
into the object. The arts, in Plotinian philosophy, do not merely
copy the visible world. "They give no bare reproduction of the thing
seen but go back to the Reason-Principles from which Nature itself
derives " .20 In this philosophy, the higher imagination, operating as
an important part of the rational soul , is seen to possess, blend,
and harmonize. It is capable of reducing multiplicity to unity.
"Poised toward that unity", states Plotinus , the "divine souls always
move".21 Wordsworth and Coleridge echo a similar belief in the power
of imagination , not only to "reduce multitude into unity of effect"
but also to enable the poet to become one with the objects of his
contemplation . This unifying power of the rational soul is dealt with
in Plotinian philosophy :
In proportion to the truth with which the knowing faculty
knows, it ~~mes to identification with the object of its
knowledge.
The importance of Plotinian thought , therefore, and its sub-
sequent influence on the evolving concept of imagination , ouqht - not be
underestimated. Far from being a deceiving faculty, imagination is
seen to be pre-eminently a truthful and truth-seeking one . It is the
divine vision within, the " i nn e r light" which enables man, not only to
perceive the God-reflecting unity of natural objects , but also to
21 I b i d., VI, 9, 621.
22 I b i d., III , 8 , 244.
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possess · that very unity.
Plotinian philosophy influenced seventeenth-century thought,
particularly the thinking of the Cambridge Platonists, a small group
which, although its center was at Cambridge, cannot be confined to
there, and whom we may rightly identify as the English Platonists .
These men , although not especially interested in aesthetics, neverthe-
less challenged , in their philosophy, Hobbes I s concept of the mind
and , consequently, of the imagination . Hobbes 's concept of the mind
was that of a passive receiver of sensory impressions . The English
Platonists, on the other hand, believed the mind to be creative and
active in perception .
"The human mind", wrote Ralph Cudworth , "hath a power of
forming ideas and conceptions, not only of what actually is, but also of
tih i.nq s which never were " . Cudworth goes on to describe wisdom as " t h e
breath (or vigor) of the power of God. . . a clear mirror (or looking-
glass) of his active energy". 23
In objecting to the doctrine of pure materialism propounded by
Hobbes, the English Platonists emphasized divine intelligence as the
ultimate reality. "The Spirit of man is the candle of the Lord",
stressed Benjamin Whichcote; reason is lux illuminate et lux illuminans;
it is the divine candle that gives light because it is lighted. 24
23 Ra l p h Cudworth, True Intellectual System, V, in Gerald R.
Cragg, ed., The Cambridge Platonists (New York: Oxford university Press,
1968), pp. 197-8.
24Whichcote frequently quoted this text from Proverbs XX, 27,
to justify the sufficiency of reason. It is quoted here from his Third
Letter to Anthony Tuckney in The Cambridge Platonists, p . 44.
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So too does Nathanael Culverwell set out to expound this favourite
analogy of the English Platonists in his treatise, An Elegant and
Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature . "We shall see. . . how the
understanding of man is the candle of the Lord,,~5 Culverwell states at
the beginning of his treatise .
In their choice of the projecting light as an analogy of the
perceiving mind , the English Platonists echoed Plotinus. A glance at
the classical references quoted in theil:: works reveals that they
quoted from Plotinus even more freely than they did from Plato. The
reason , one notes , i s closely related to their concern to portray a
spiritual interpretation of reality , and to their belief that man
"need no longer look outside for his vision of the divine being " , as
Plotinus had said , but find the strength "to see divinity within" .
As in the English Platonists , so also in the Romantic writers
does the perceiving mind frequently receive the comparison to a lamp
projecting light . Figures of the soul CiS "fountain " or "overflowing
stream" become familiar ones in Romantic poetry, and are echoes of
Neoplatonism and more especially, of Plotinian philosophy , the arch type
of mind as "p r o j e c t o r " .
It is within the philosophy of English Platonism , then , that
one recognizes in the seventeenth centul::y a notion of intuitive
25Nathanael Culverwell, The Light of Nature, in Cragg, The
Cambridge Platonists , p. 60.
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reason which bears analogy with the Romantic concept of imagination.
However, it would be misleading to s:uggest that the English Platonists
ac t ually propounded a concept of imagination that was in any way a
"Romantic" concept. They may have helped prepare the ground for the
later view of imagination, but there is nothing in their °.rr i t i n g s to
imply that they considered imagination to be anything more than a
faculty of literary invention and an unreliable one at that . To
place the English Platonists within the psychological context of their
time , one sees that they actually understood imagination to be a
misleading faculty , as John Smith indicates in his Discourses:
We mu s t shut the eye of sense , and open that b righter eye
of our understandings , that other eye of the soul. . .
Our own imaginative powers which are perpetually attending
the highest acts of our souls , will be breathing a gross
dew upon the pure glass of our understandings , and so sully
and besmear it, that we cannot see the image of the Divinity
sincerely in it. 26
On philosophical grounds, it was commonplace for any seventeenth-
century writer to distrust imagination and to regard it as " gr os s dew
upon the pure glass of our understandings". Smith was not alone in be-
lieving it to be a faculty born of the senses and therefore a creator
of phantasies , rather than an organ of truth . Whichcote spoke in a
similar vein when he stated that " by sense, imagination and brutish
affection, we can only maintain acquaintance with this outward and
26 J oh n Smith, Discourses, I, in Gerald R. Cragg, The Cambridge
Platonists , pp. 86-90.----
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lower world". 27 Man's proper business resides "in the things of the
mind", Whichcote continued. Therefore he can arrive at truth only by
using those higher faculties of reason and understanding.
One could say here that Milton, also, shared with the Platonists
the view that the law of God is written "upon man's heart and that
reason alone constitutes the godlike principle in man, exercising a
moral control. The senses were very important for Mil ton, but reason
constituted the highest faculty. In the absence of reason, imagination
carne out to play and dance. We recall Adam I s remark to Eve in
Paradise Lost:
Evil into the mind of god or man
May corne and go, so unapproved, and leave
No spot or blame behind; which give me hope
That which in sleep thou didst abhor to dream,
Waking thou never wilt consent to do. 28
Fancy and imagination were truly untrustworthy faculties. Satan
whispered into Eve I s ear while she was alseep because he knew that
imagination was her most vulnerable faculty:
For Understanding ruled not, and the Will
Heard not her lore, both in subjection now
To sensual Appetite, who from beneath
usurp~ng over sovr~~ Reason claimed
superi.o.r sway. . .
27Benjamin Whichcote, "The Work of Reason", in Gerald R. Cragg,
The Cambridge Platonists , p. 64.
28 J ohn Milton, Paradise Lost, in James Holly Hanford, ed.,
The Poems of John Mil ton (2nd ed., New York: The Ronald Press Company,
1953), V, 117-21.
29 I b i d., IX, 1127-31.
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Imagination, then, as understood in the seventeenth century IS
use of that term, was a misleading faculty. Locke would have nothing
to do with it. He had little to say directly about the imagination;
however , what he did say about poetry in general was of a disparaging
nature. In the third chapter of his Essay Concerning Human Understand-
h'l>\. •
ing (1690 ) / he dismisses figurative language as having been invented
for no other reason than to perpetrate wrong ideas, excite the passions,
and thereby mislead the judgment.
Metaphor and simile were frequently assailed because they were
regarded as forms of falsehood and deception. Sprat I s History gives
witness to the efforts of the Royal Society to banish poetic language
as "embellishments", "ornaments of speech" employed in open defiance
against reason.
Control of the imaginative faculty seemed essential.
setting up their standards, theorists did not wish that imagination be
given complete license, but that it work in conjunction with judgment:
It makes for discoveries and soars above reason , but never
clashes or runs against it. Fancy leaps and frisks , and away
she 's gone, while reason rattles the chains and follows after.
~ea~on must consent and rati~y whatever by . fa~8Y is attempted
an a t s absence, or else all J. S null and vo i.d ,
Generally, in the Neoclassical poetry of the late seventeenth
century and onwards , imagination I s role was to provide embellishment to
thought. Thus imagination was distinguished from the primary faculty,
30Thomas Rymer , The Tragedies of the Last Age (1678), in
Spingarn, II, 185, as quoted by Donald Bond in '" Distrust ' of Imagina-
tion in English Neo-Classicism" . Philological Quarterly , XIV , 1,
January 1935 .
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the reason, which must ever be on guard to control the wild- ranging
imaginative faculty . The Romantics will, in some respects , J:::"everse
this . Th ey wil l speak of reason , but a reason activated, en~rgized,
and illuminated by imagination . Nevertheless , the most imag.i.native
poets of the seventeenth century, even though imagination wa~ dOvm-
played, often wrote genuine poetry , even by Romantic standarcls. Mil ton,
whatever he may have thought of the imagination , produced in Paradise
Lost a highly imaginative work. Among eighteenth century PO~ts , who
combined a didacticism with conscious delight, stands Pope . While he
may have considered the discursive element in poetry to be primary , he
nevertheless was capable of using language with such skill an.d imagina-
tion that his lines are a delight to read.
One may conclude of the seventeenth-century poet, however , that
he aimed " t o please" , in the manner set forth by Sidney; that. is , he
aimed "to teach goodness and to delight the learners". 31 Wit.hin Neo-
classic theory, furthermore , Hobbes would enshrine for more t.han a cen-
tury the belief that "judgment begets the strength and struct.ure; and
Fancy begets the Ornaments of a poeme".32 This concept of im.agination,
namely, the facility to reproduce images, to provide poetry With its
rhetoric , its p leasing externals , would in time be challenged, for with-
in the scope of such a theory , the imaginative faculty was an. adorning ,
not a truthful or a truthbearing one. Not even in English Platonism,
31Sidney 's Defence, p. 48.
32Hobbes's Answer to D'Avenant , p. 49 .
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whose concept of the " i nne r light" bears direct analogy with Romantic
theorists , do we proceed to any assurance of imaginative truth beyond
that of the "fictional". Imagination, as seventeenth and eighteenth-
century theorists conceived it, operated in a manner somewhat distinct
from, and always in subordination to, the "reason". One does not look
to the imagination as a channel of truth in Neo -classic theory any
more than one did in Renaissance theory . Such a concept has yet to
emerge .
"The Pleasures of the Imagination"
Sprat, in his History of the Royal Society (1667), had voiced
an objective that was conunon among seventeenth-century theorists,
namely, to make poetry resemble prose, in order to achieve "a close,
naked, natural way of speaking", and thus bring "all things as near
1
the Mathematical plainness" as possible. It was indeed an age of
reform in prose, when simplicity and plainness of style seemed most
desirable. This is not to say that the workings of the imagination,
though suspect amid prose's "mathematical plainness", could be dis-
pensed with in poetry. Fancy (imagination) still provided the "orna-
ments" of a poem. However, there seemed to have been general agreement
that the judgment should work together with the imagination. The poet
should instruct, as well as please, and without the restraint imposed by
the judgment he could be led into certain irregularities of thought and
sentiment. A complaint of certain critics was that many poets "seemed
to have studied rather to say fine things than just ones", as stated
earlier.
An examination of English Neoclassic literature shows the
critic, and often the poet, to be very much more concerned with "how"
he said something, rather than with "what" he said, the aim being to
achieve, in the words of Pope, "what oft was Thought, but ne' er so well
IHistory of the Royal Society, p. 113.
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expressed" . The dominant concept of language was that of 'dress',
the dress of thought. Words were like outer accouterments which one
could put on without altering the body underneath. It was a cloven
concept. Between the words, and what words said , there existed a
division. Such a concept of language would undergo a change in
Romanticism. Language , the "d r e s s of t ho ug ht" for the Neoclassics
would become the very " i n c a r n a t i on of thought " in Romantic theory .
A pivotal figure to consider i n terms of this transition , and
in terms of the evolutionary concept of imagination , is Joseph Addison .
His views on "The Pleasures of the Imagination " , published in the
Specta tor papers in 1712 , prompted both poet and reader to take a
closer look at poetry, not only for its clear and exact ideas, but also
for the emotional association aroused by its imagery . They were alerted
to see at work in poetry the power of "wo r ds ", which , said Addison ,
. . . when well chosen , have so great a Force in them, that a
Description often gives us more lively Ideas than the Sight
of Things themselves. The Reader finds a Scene drawn in
stronger Colours , and painted more to the Life in his Imagination,
by the help of Words , than by an actual Survey of the Scene
which they describe . 2
Addison is applying Locke I s theory of the association of ideas
to literary criticism, and is asking the reader to consider the emotional
association which imagery arouses. What he is saying to his reader is
this: through its power of association , there is scarcely any limit to
where imagination can lead us:
2Joseph Addison, The Spectator, ed., Donald F. Bond (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1965) , Vol. III, No. 416, p . 560.
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. We may observe, that any single circumstance of what
we have formerly seen often raises up a whole Scene of
Imagery, and awakens numberless Ideas that before slept in the
Imagination; such a particular Smell, or Colour is able to
fill the Mind, on a sudden, with the Picture of the Fields or
Gardens where we first met with it, and to bring up into View
all the Variety of Images that once attended it. Our Imagina-
tion takes the Hint, and leads us unexpectedly into Cities or
Theatres, Plains or Meadows. We may further observe , when the
Fancy thus reflects, on the Scenes that have past in it formerly,
.t.hose , which were at first pleasant to behold appear more so
upon Reflection, and that the Memory heightens the Delightful-
ness of the Original. 3
Imagination is being allied with memory, as in Hobbes I s theory. Imagina-
tive experience, as Addison states in No. 411 of "The Pleasures of the
Imagination", arises from the sense of sight, and once received , these
images are retained in the memory. One has but to open the eye and the
scene enters. The image imprints itself on the imagination with little
thought.
A basic assumption here is that the workings of the imagination
are pleasurable. Addison speaks of Primary pleasures of the imagination
as being those which proceed directly from objects before the eyes;
Secondary pleasures are those which flow from the ideas of those objects
when later they are recalled to memory. More explicitly, Primary
pleasures proceed from the sight of that which is "Great, Uncommon, or
Beautiful" (No. 412). In effect, Addison is saying that man's imagina-
tion, desiring to be filled with an object, grasps at anything that is
too big for its capacity. "A spacious Horizon is an Image of Liberty",
we read in Paper No. 412. If , on the contrary, the mind is confined
3Th e Spectator, Vol. III, No. 417, p. 562.
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wi thin a narrow compass, it becomes pent up. Nothing more than the
sight of the new or the uncommon fills the soul , and nothing more than
the sight of beauty fills the spirit, diffusing "a secret Satisfaction
and complacency through the Imagination". The cause of such pleasure
resides with the Godhead, the
Supreme Author of our Being who has so formed the Soul of
Man , that nothing .b u t himself can be its last, adequate, and
proper Happiness . Because, therefore , a great Part of our
Happiness must arise from the Contemplation of his Being ,
that he might give our Souls a just Relish of such a Contempla-
tion, he has made them naturall~ delight in the Apprehension of
what is Great or Unlimited. . .
Addison next defines the Secondary pleasures of the imagination,
that is, those pleasures which arise from the mind's contemplation of
those images when they are later recalled (No. 416). It is from the
affinity of ideas arising from the original objects with the ideas
representing them, that these pleasures derive. This, he states, is
what makes pleasant the various kinds of wit, for example. Pleasures of
the imagination proceed from ideas raised by "words":
It may be here worth our while to Examine, how it comes to
pass that several Readers, who are all acquainted with the
same language, and know the Meaning of the Words they read,
should nevertheless have a different Relish of the same
Descriptions. We find one transported with a Passage , which
another runs over with Coldness and Indifference, or finding the
Representation extremely natural, where another can perceive
nothing of Likeness and Conformity. This different Taste
must proceed, either from the Perfection of Imagination in one
more than in another, or from the different Ideas that several
Readers affix to the same Words. For, to have a true Relish,
and form a right Judgment of a Description, a Man should be born
4Th e Spectator, III, No. 413, p. 545.
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with a good Imagination, and must have well weighed the
Force and Energy that li e in . the several Words of a Language,
so as to be able to distinguish which are most significant
and expressive of their proper Ideas, and what additional
Strength and Beauty they are capable of receiving from
Conj·unction with others...5
Not only poets and critics, but readers as well, will be
prompted by Addison's theory to set as much store by the connotation
of words as b y their denotation. His explanation for the difference
among readers' responses arises, he states, from the fact that a
passage arouses in the readers different associations.
Here he is applying the principle of association to the
readers' emotions, as well as their ideas. He is thereby establishing
a framework which accounts for differences in 'taste', something to
which he gives an important role in aesthetic judgments.
Taste, Addison defines, is that faculty of the soul which
discerns the beauties of an author with pleasure, and the imperfections
wi th dislike. 6 Al though he proceeds to show how the faculty can be
cultivated, Addison admits that taste must in some measure "be born
with us". To have a true relish, and form a good judgment of a
description, he states earlier, a man should be born with a good imagina-
tion. One sees here that imagination and taste are being made part
of that inner sense whereby the mind is impressed (even though passively)
with the forms of greatness, goodness and beauty. By stressing the
power of imagination to refine taste, Addison is touching on a subject
5Th e Spectator, III, No. 416, p. 561.
6 I b i d., No. 409, p. 528.
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that will receive the attention of succeeding theorists who will set
out to prove that there is something in the judgment o f literature
which is not subject merely to pure reason, but which c a n be ascertained
' i n t u i t i v e l y'; and intuition involves the f eelings as well as the
imagination .
Of special mention by Addison were those representations of
obj e c t s wh ich "r a i s e a secret ferment " in the mind of the reader and
which work "wit h vio lence upon his passions " . Th e two leading
passions which the mor e serious poetry endeavours to stir up in us ,
he continued to state , are " Te r r o r and Pity " . From whence do these
feelings in response to the situation proceed?
. . . when we read of Torments, Wounds, Deaths, and the like
dismal Accidents, our Plea s ure does not flow so properly
from the Grief which such melancholly Descriptions give us,
as from the secret Comparison which we make between our selves
and the Person who suffers. Such Representations teach us to
set a just Value upon our own Conditions , and make us
prize our good Fortune which exempts us from the Like Calamities.
This is , however , such a kind of Pleasure a s we are not capable
of receiving , when we s e e a Person actually lying under the
Tortures that we meet with in a Description; because , in this
Cas e , the Object presses too close upon our Senses , and
bears so hard upon us , that it does not give u s t ime or leisure
to reflect on our selves. Our Thoughts are so intent up on the
Miseries of t he Sufferer , that we cannot turn t h em up on our own
Happiness . Whereas , on the contrary , we consider t he Mi s f o r -
tunes we read in History or Poetry , e i t he r as past , or as fic-
ti t ious , so that the Reflection upon our selves ri ses i n us
insensibly , and over-bears the Sorrow we c on c e i v e for the
Sufferings of the Afflicted . 7
7The Spectator , I II, 418, pp . 568- 69 .
43
One .s e e s that in Addison's criticism, the feelings are given a new
emphasis, and are consequently being raised to a new dignity.
It would be misleading to read a full-blown, Romantic theory
of imagination in Addison. He is still sufficiently close to Lockian
epistemology not to escape the notion that imagination merely pro-
vides the embellishments to poetry:
The Fancy must be warm, to retain the print of those Images
it hath received from outward Objects; and the Judgment
discerning, to know what Expressions are most proper to
cloath and adorn them to her best Advantage. 8
In Addison I s theory, the imaginative faculty is no source of
higher illumination, as it is seen to be in Romantic theory. Rather,
it is used to combine images of sensation together in order to form
new ideas. Nevertheless, in certain respects, Addison may be seen as
standing at the head of a movement toward Romanticism. He believed,
for instance, that "words" possessed an imaginative power:
Words, when well chosen, have so great Force in them, that
a Description often gives us more lively Ideas than the Sight
of Things themselves. The Reader finds a Scene drawn in
stronger Colours, and painted more to the Life in his
Imagination, by the help of Words, than by an actual Survey
of the Scene which they describe. In this Case the Poet
seems to get the better of Nature; he takes , indeed, the
Landskip after her, but gives it more vigorous Touches,
heightens its Beauty, and so enlivens the whole Piece, that
the Images, which flow from the Objects themselves, appear
weak and faint, in Comparison of those that corne from the Ex-
pressions. 9
8Th e Spectator, III, 416, p. 561.
9 I b i d.
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This belief of Addison in the imaginative power of words looks forward
to Wordsworth I s belief that language constitutes the medium "through
which, in poetry, the heart is to be affected". 10
Another "forward-looking" hint in Addison I s criticism is his
belief in the ability of the poet to "mend and perfect Nature". The
poet, he states, has the "modelling of Nature" in his own hands.
his paper No. 419, he refers to the poet I s special ability to "lose
sight of Nature" entirely, and entertain his readers I imaginations
with a "Fairie way of Writing", as Dryden called it. Only the poet who
has a particular "Cast of Fancy" and an imagination naturally fruitful
and superstitious, states Addison, will excel at this type of writing,
one which portrays fairies, witches, magicians, demons, and departed
spiri ts and the like--creations of the poet I s imagination. In this
Addison is implying that such farfetched material, while not conformable
to right reason or good sense, is nevertheless legitimate material for
poetry. It raises, he says, "a pleasing kind of Horrour in the Mind of
the Reader".
One could almost detect in Addison I s concept of the imagination,
a creative, rather than a passive power. Indeed, imagination does have
"something in it like Creation", he states in his final paper on "The
Pleasures of the Imagination" (No. 421).
It bestows a kind of Existence, and draws up to the Reader 's
View, several Obj ects which are not to be found in Being. It
10William Wordsworth, "Essay, Supplementary to the Preface"
(1815), eds. W. J. B. Owen and Jane worthington Smyser, The Prose Works
of William Wordsworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), Vol. III, p. 82.
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makes Additions to Nature, and gives a greater variety to
God's Works. In a word, it is able to beautifie and adorn the
most illustrious Scenes in the Universe, or to fill the Mind
with more glori~ys Shows and Apparitions, than can be found in
any Part of it.
It is as though the world of imaginative experience is capable of
constituting a new world , an existence of its own. In portraying the
imagination as an autonomous faculty , Addison is treading a new path.
Although he adheres to the traditional view that judgment must work
along with the imagination , nowhere do we find , in his criticism , the
warnings that the imagination must remain a faithful servant of reason.
"This talent of affecting the Imagination... is the very Life and
highest Perfection of Poetry" , he s tates in paper No. 421.
Having not only the circle of nature for its province ,
imagination goes forth to create new worlds , even showing us fairies,
wi tches , magicians , and demons which have no existence other than that
which the poet bestows upon them. Far from condemning such writing (we
recall Sprat I s denouncement of the I false world of spirits and chimeras ') ,
Addison 's theory is that "we have all heard so many pleasing Relations
in favour of them , that we do not care for seeing through the Falsehood,
and willingly give our selves up to so agreeable an Imposture " . 12
One must credit Addi son I s papers on "Th e Pleasures of the
Imagination" as constituting the first work ever written on imagination
lIThe Spectator, III , 421, p. 579.
l2 I b i d., 419, pp. 571-2.
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as a wholly autonomous subject. These papers may be regarded as a
gateway to .aesthetics . . The emergence of aesthetics does have a
bearLnq on the evolving concept of imagination in pre-Romantic
criticism. Art is beginning to be looked upon as something more than a
form of discourse .
The importance of ' t a s t e I _ in aesthetic judgments as anticipated
in Addison and developed earlier by Shaftesbury, helped to prepare the
groundwork for Romanticism, because it included an intuitive response
to literature, an imaginative and emotional response , both in the poet
and in the reader.
Francis Hutcheson , a disciple of Shaftesbury, likewise views
the imagination as one of the noble "inner senses" . These internal
senses contemplate the ideas which the external senses convey to the
mind . Hutcheson owes his psychology , as does Addison, to Locke :
Let it be observ'd here once for all that an internal Sense
no more presupposes an innate Idea, or Principle of Knowledge ,
than the external. Both are natural Powers of Perception,
or Determinations of the Mind to receive necessarily certain
Ideas from the Presence of Obj ects . The Internal Sense is ,
a passive Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty from all Objects
in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety .13
The finer senses imply a passivity in the subject ; they con-
template the ideas which the external senses convey to the mind. To
13Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas
of Beauty and virtue (4th ed. , London: Gregg International Publishers
Limited, 1969), p , 80.
47
have a greater capacity of receiVing pleasant ideas is to have a finer
taste. Hutcheson is one of the many writers in the e i g h t e e n t h century,
most of whom were philosophers, who begin to theorize about aesthetics.
Alexander Gerard follows Iiutcheson in regarding ' t a s t e ' as an
inner sense. Taste derives its o~igin from certain powers natural to
the mind, states Gerard, but these powers cannot realize their full
perfection
. unless t hey be assisted by proper culture . Taste
consists chiefly in the improvements of these principles which
are commonly called the power of imagination, and are considered
by modern philosophers as internal or reflex senses , supplying
us with finer and more delicate perceptions , than any which
can be properly referred to our external organs . 14
Those internal senses from which taste is formed, Gerard
proceeds to state, derive from the imagination, the faculty which ex-
hibits ideas of many objects which we never perceived, the conception
of which , therefore , cannot be attended with remembrance, in his opinion. 1 5
When memory has lost the real bonds of union among ideas , fancy , by its
associating powers , confers upon them new ties .
Imagination in Gerard is an associative power , binding together
images of sensation to form new ones . "Sensations , emotions and
affections are , by its power , associated with others . . . ,,16 It is
from the operations of imagination the sentiments of taste arise .
Again , one notices that the notion of imagination is that of
14Alexander Gerard , An Essay on Taste (New York: Garland
Publishing , Inc., 1970), pp . 1-2 .
15 I b i d . , p. 157.
16 I b i d ., p. 166 .
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a passive reflector of images. It is the "vigour of the associating
17
principles which renders genius quick and comprehensive", Gerard
states.
One sees in the views of Addison, Hutcheson and Gerard ,
growing emphasis upon aesthetics. Whether he realized it or not,
the eighteenth-century aesthetic ian was slowly coming into his own.
For any radical change in the view of imagination, however , one must
look to writers whose philosophical tradition differed from that of
Hobbes and Locke. Important as imagination is seen to be among eight-
eenth century theorists, it is still seen as a passive reflector of
images.
For the first time in literary history , however , I taste I is
being viewed as a sub-division of the imaginative faculty . This so-
called " Sc ho o l of Taste " (o f which Shaftesbury was the leading propon-
ent) began to emphasize a spontaneous rather than a purely rational
response to art and literature . In thus emphasizing intuitive , rather
than discursive, reason, and in creating a valid role for the feelings,
other theorists in mid-eighteenth century would begin a redefinition of
the Neoclassic principles , standards and rules. A slow but definite
shift would be made away from the sanctions of reason , truth and nature,
to new and varied qualities which would appeal to the imagination of
both reader and poet. It would be a shift away from authority,
tradition, and formalism , in the direction of originality and the
creative imagination. In this slow but definite change, Addison ' s
17 An Essay on Taste. p . 172.
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criticism played an important part in certain respects. In examining
the imagination as an autonomous ,faculty, one which constituted "the
very Life and highest Perfection of Poetry", he set the mood for a
theorizing about imagination which would occupy writers for decades.
In other respects, however, he still remained close to the dominant,
Neoclassic view--one in which poetry conformed to standards of good
sense, and in which the imagination, which provided the "embellishment"
to sense, remained subject to reason's control.
A Growing Empha s Ls on ""Peeling" and "Sensibility"
Locke I s ph i.Loaophy helped .set standards for conformity to
' t ru t h' which characterized much of the poetry of the early and middle
eighteenth century. A comparison of certain representative poems of the
century with those of previous centuries attests to the influence on
Li, terature and on literary criticism of the empirical , rationalistic
thinking of Locke and his followers , particularly in their setting of
standards for the voice of "common experience" to be heard. One might
compare Pope's Essay on Man with Dante's Inferno or with Milton's
Paradise Lost, for example, and be tempted to conclude that the Neo -
classic poet tended to regard poetry as a superior refinement on the
persuasive art of oratory. He concerned himself primarily with "verbal
wit ".
Wi t was closely allied with imagination in Locke I s theory of
knowledge. It meant for him, as it did for Hobbes and for Dryden, a
certain "quickness of parts", whe reby ideas, that is to say , the contents
of the storehouse of memory , were brought forth. Locke was quick to
point out, in this regard, that the products of wit please men because
they see its beauty at first sight and no labour of thought is needed
to examine it for any degree of truth, and it is evidence of truth
alone , in Locke I s theory of knowledge, which makes for human certainty,
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not clearness of fancy. Men who have a great deal of wit are not
known for their clear judgment, states Locke.
One may infer from his theory that the only way to arrive
at truth is by exorcising the phantasies of imagination. Basil
Willey, in his book, The Seventeenth century Background, makes an
interesting comparison between Locke and Milton which reveals, what-
ever the ideas they may have held in common, a difference in tone and
aim, reflecting the difference between Renaissance and Augustan
thinking :
. . . It is wholly in the cool element of prose that Locke
lives and moves. The passionate sense of life as perilous,
glorious or tragic which inspired Mil ton to prophecy , whether
in prose or in vers e , has all departed; ins tead , there is a
feeling of severity , of confidence in the rationality of the
universe , in the virtuousness of man, in the stability of 1
society , and in the deliverance of enlightened common sense . . .
The new philosophy was not without its influence on the Neo-
classic critic and poet , and while not disparaging the i magination
and its function, subjected it to the rigorous control of the judgment.
Hobbes I S insistence on the control of judgment over the exorbitancy of
imagination or fancy as set forth in his Answer to Davenant particularly
influenced rationalistic aesthetic theory. Adhering strongly to the
principles of decorum, Neoclassic criticism may be seen to look suspect
on poetic displays of passion and feeling, encouraging direct, verifiable
comment upon men and manners and upon universal nature . Neoclassic
poetry impresses us as being public and occasional , presented in a
IBasil Willey , The Seventeenth Century Background (London:
Chatto and Windus, 1962, pp. 267-8 .
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language "fitted for discourse and nearest prose", as Dryden would
have it. It echoed, in practice, Boileau's dictum that "plainness
and naturalness" should prevail, aiming at " s e n s e " . The poet endeavoured
to write as an interpreter of nature and as a legislator of mankind.
As an interpreter, he was more concerned with conveying the familiar
aspects of life rather than the abstract or the unknown. If his
imaginative or fanciful inventions prevailed over the reason , then
they were not to be trus ted.
Willey I s book does much to show that the who le philosophical
movement , on which Locke was the greatest influence , " t o l d against
poetry and the poetic imagination. It relegated the mind 's shaping
power to an inferior status ". 2 What this cold philosophy did , in
Willey I s opinion , was to "d e s t r oy . . . the union or heart and head,
the synthesis of thought and feeling, out of which major poetry seems
to be born " . 3
One cannot reduce the eighteenth century to a formula ; however ,
it seems to have demonstrated a greater unity of character than most
centuries . The careful historian sees within it, nonetheless , a
mixture of diverse elements. While poetry, prose, and drama carne to
rely more and more on objective truth , there is evidence of a counter-
balancing movement, one that is rooted in the subjective or intuitive
2Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background , p. 291.
3I b i d., p. 294.
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tradition. Out of this movement, the Romantic concept of the
imagination would evolve.
Already, we have observed how Platonism (or neo-Platonism)
continued to survive into the seventeenth century through the English
Platonists. The evangelical movements in religion were also united
under a cornmon allegiance: truth for them was guaranteed by that
" i nne r light" or intuitive reason and moral sense, and was not
dependent upon empirical experience . This , too, was another of those
elements out of which Romantic theory would emerge .
Even though this is so, it is also true to say that Romantic
theory would derive a great deal from the empiricist tradition.
Wordsworth 's theory of imagination, for example, would be rooted in
his belief in the value of "sensory perception". Poetry must begin
wi th a careful observation of the visible world . Imagination must
attend with care to the r eports of the senses--on this he founded his
concept of imagination . Wordsworth also believed that the influence
of nature carne partly through the senses. In some ways Romanticism
would constitute an attempt to harmonize the Empiricist and the
Platonic traditions, as difficult as this may appear to be.
As the eighteenth cen tury progres sed , then , the concept of
imagination and how it functioned underwent a slow but definite
change. Locke 's world , wherein atoms constituted the only reality,
was to give way to a world where ' f e e l i ngs ", 'benevolence ' , and
'sentiment I were beginning to be operative in poetic composition .
The inherent formalism of an age of rules was beginning to motivate
the poet to enhance the value of natural goodness afforded by the
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spontaneous expression of feelings , as opposed to conventions.
Beauty, truth , and goodness were beginning to overtake conformity to
discursive reason and decorum as primary values.
This shift in aesthetical values which seems to characterize
the second half of the eighteenth century is part of an evolving
process . It is a shift toward an intuitive response to literature.
Under its influence, theorists are beginning to study new ways of
interpreting the imaginative faculty .
Ernest Lee Tuveson in his book, The Imagination as a Means of
Grace , deals in a co mprehensive manner with some of these evolutionary
changes in the concept of imagination in eighteenth century thought,
particularly in the light of Locke I s theory of knowledge. Concepts of
the perceiving mind undoubtedly underwent a change as Locke I s theories
began to shed new light on how the mind receives and deals with
sensations , and how these sensations are related to truth. One result
of this new thinking may be seen in the apparent , even if gradual ,
laying aside of the classical tradition. Artists are now beginning
to work in response to a set of conceptions about man , the way he
thinks, and the effect of experience on the psyche--responses which
in some ways were radically different from those which had pre-
viously held sway. Locke in his epistemology, stresses Tuveson ,
did something that not even Newton had done :
. . . he taught them new ways of thinking, in the literal
sense of that phrase . He inaugurated or made necessary a
rethinking of every aspect of the personality; soul,
conscience, reason, imagination, even immortali ty itself.
All these concepts were destined to undergo metamorphoses as
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theories of how the mind receives sensations, how it deals 4
with them, and how it is related to truth were transformed.
One must look to Shaftesbury as a watershed figure in this
transi tion period. A disciple of the Cambridge Platonists, Shaftes-
bury objected strongly to the views of Hobbes, whose influence was
still being felt in Shaftesbury' s day. Hobbes I s theory negated any
form of spiritual interpretation of the universe . Such an atmosphere
was uncongenial to the arts, a subj ect which concerned Shaftesbury .
One can see in his philosophy the desire to offset any purely
mechanical interpretation of the universe , and an effort to provide
the basis for truth , goodness , and beauty .
Shaftesbury rejected the idea that the human mind was a
passive receptacle of ideas which join together by association.
saw the mind as being analogous to the Mind of the divine Creator ,
and therefore a mind that was creative and active:
What is it you admire but mind , or the effects of mind?
Tis mind alone which forms. · . All wh i c h is void of mind is
horrid , and matter formless is deformity itself . 5
Just as the workings of the human mind are comparable to the divine
Mind, so too are the works of art comparable to the workings of
nature, in Shaftesbury's view, because both are brought into existence
by a divine, creative energy . Theocles I s invocation of nature in
Shaftesbury I s philosophical treatise, The Moralists, reveals the
4Ernest Lee Tuveson , The Imagination as a Means of Grace
(New York : Gordonian Press , 1974 ) , pp. 5-6 .
SAnthony Earl of Shaftesbury , Characteristics of Men , Manners,
Opinions , Times, etc., ed. John M. Robertson (Gloucester, Mass : Peter
smlEh, 1963) , vol. II, p. 132.
56
a uthor 's beliefs in the creative power of nature :
o g lorious na ture : supremely fair and sovereignly qood !
all-loving and all-lovely , all d i.v.i.n e : .
o mi gh t y Nature ~ wise substitute of p rov i dence : impowered
cre a t.r es s : Or t ho u impowering Deity , supreme c r ea to.r ; Thee
I invoke and thee alone adore .
I sing of Nature 's order in created b eings , and ce l e b r a te
the beauti e s which r esolve in thee , the source and principle
of all beauty and perfection .
" Ye t since by thee , 0 sovereign mind , I have been formed
such as I am , intelligent and rational , since the peculiar
dignity of my nature is to know and contemplate thee , p ermit
that with due freedom I exert those faculti es with which thou
hast adorned me... be thou my assistant and guide me in t his
pursuit , whilst I venture thus to tread the labyrinth of
wide Nature and e nd e a vo u r to trace thee in thy works. 6
The active principle in man , analogous to the forming pow er
in nature is , in Shaftesbury ' s philosophy, irnagination- -an ag ent of
reason . In his Advice to an Author , h e refers to the poet who posses ses
such an i ma g i n a t i on as one who ,
. . . as a r eal master, or architect in the kind , can de scribe
both men and manners , and give to an action its just body
and proportion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Such a poet is inde ed a second Maker; a just Prometheus under
Jove. Like that sovereign arti st or universal plastic nature ,
he forms a whole , coherent and proportioned in i t~elf, with du e
.s ub j e c t i o n and subordinancy of constituent parts .
Such a claim for a c r e a t i v e i ma g i n a t i o n, as i s here i mpli ed,
runs counter to Hobb e s 's analogy of imagination and memory- - "decaying
s ense". Addison dealt with the faculty o f imagination as a source of
aesthetic pleasure . One notices that Shaftesbury 's Moralists , a s well
6Shaftesbury , Characteristics of Men , Manners , Opinions, Times ,
etc. Vol. II , pp. 98-99 .
7Shaftesbury , "Adv i c e to an Author " , in Characteristics , Vol. 1 ,
p , 135-6 , and quoted by R. L. Brett in The T h i r d Earl of Shaftesbury
(London : Hutchinson ' s university Library, ~9 5l ) , p . 105.
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as his complete Characteristics were published one year prior to
Addison I S papers "On the Pleasures of the Imagination" (1712). It is
likely that Addison read Shaftesbury and was influenced by him.
ever, Addison does not take the concept of imagination beyond that of
'appreciation'. It is in Shaftesbury that one sees a breakthrough:
imagination is portrayed as a faculty of creation, a power analogous
to the divine Power itself. This power puts man in harmony with
nature, God, the beautiful and the true--all are One . Man is born with
a natural appetite for these ultimates of goodness , beauty and truth.
Shaftesbury sometimes uses the word "taste" to refer to this innate
sense , the cultivation of which, he affirms in his Miscellanies,
must be consciously carried out: "A legitimate and just taste can
neither be begotten, made , conceived , or produced without the antecedent
labour and pains of criticism. ,,8
This stress on man' s intuitive , moral sense in eighteenth-
century criticism is significant, and runs counter to Lockian episte-
mology. What is happening is that the problem of ' s t a nd a r ds' is
being reduced to a basic subjectivism. By enhancing beauty , truth,
and goodness as desirable goals, man 's emotional response to literature
is being enhanced . The imagination is thus becoming a primary force.
The poet is becoming indeed "a just Prometheus under Jove"; he is
assuming a role that bears relation to the divine Maker .
8Shaftesbury, Miscellanies, III, Ch . 2 , in Characteristics, II,
p. 257.
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It must be remembered that Shaftesbury was primarily a moral
philosopher , yet his views helped shape li terary ideals. In emphasiz-
ing man I s emo tional response to poetry, and in stressing the imagina-
tion as the elevating force toward lofty serenity, he linked j udgment
wi th the feelings and emotions , anticipating Wordsworth I s concept of
the " f e el i n g intellect". In Shaftesbury I s criticism the Neoclassic
idea of the man of cultivated taste and the Romantic notion of the man
of feeling become closely allied . Furthermore , h is stress on the idea
of "innate endowment " borders closely on later concepts concerning
"g e n i u s" .
Shaftesbury I s doctrine emphasizes man I s natural , a ltruistic
instincts and indicates the harmony that can exist between the emotions
of the poet and the scenes of nature which surround him . His enthusiasm,
as it applied to the arts , helped lead poets to a new enthusiasm for
nature, to which the works of James Thomson , Joseph Warton and others
give testimony.
It is in these and other aspects that Shaftesbury anticipates
the theories of the Romanticist. One cannot overlook the fact that,
. . . in an epoch of dry matter-of-fact thinking , he soothed
the imagination of his readers with a music which appealed
to the emotions , and which set vibrating the presageful echo
of future voices. 9
Despite those echoes of "future vo ices" in Shaftesbury I s
criticism, one sees that his aesthetical theories remain largely within
9Emile Legouis and Louis Cazamian , A History of English Literature
(rev. edn ., London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1957 ), p. 79 3 .
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the framework of the Neoclassic principles of decorum and of con-
scious craftsmanship. The faculty of reason, not of imagination,
remains paramount. What is significant in his aesthetics is his
emphasi s on man I s instincts, emotions and sensibilities; it is this
which helps pave the way for a growing emphasis on these factors in
li terary criticism. In terms of a developing concept of imagination,
the gradual transformation of these principles is highly significant .
certain other cri tical posi tions receive emphasis as the
eighteenth century moves toward its second half. In 1759 Edward
Young 's Conjectures on Original Composition made a strong case for
"o r i g i n a l i ty " even while recognizing the value of the mimetic
theory:
. . . imitation must be the lot (and often an honorable lot
it is) of mos t writers. I f there is a famine of invention in
the land , like Joseph's brethren, we must travel far for food;
we must visit the remote and rich ancients. But an inventive
genius may safely stay at home; that , like the widow 's cruse,
is divinely replenished from wi thin , and affords us a
miraculous delight. Whether our own genius be such or not ,
we diligently should inquire, that we may not go begging with
gold in our purse ; for there is a mine in man which must be
deeply dug ere we can conjecture its contents . 10
Even more persuasive than Edward Young 's Conjectures , however,
was Sir Joshua Reynold I s counterbalancing Discourses (1769-70 ) , which
helped keep alive the tradi tional mimetic approach to literature:
To derive all from native power, to owe nothing to another ,
is the praise which men , who do not much think on what they
10Edward Young, "Conjectures on Original Composition"in England
and Germany ed. Martin William Steinke (U. S : Folcroft Library Editions,
~54.
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are saying , bestow sometimes upon others, and sometimes
on themselves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
We cannot suppose that anyone can really mean to exclude
all imitation of others. A position so wild would scarce
deserve a serious answer; f o r it i s apparent, if we were
forbid to make use of the advantage wh ich our predecessors
afford us , the art wo u l d be a lways to begin, and consequently
remain in its infant state, and it is a common observation
that no art was e ver invented an d carried t o perfection at
the same time . 11
It has already been observed that most critics of the seventeenth
century had accepted Aristotle 's doctrine of mimesis , in t h a t they
regarded poetry as an imitation of nature . In showing how the poet 's
mind worked , Hobbes had portrayed the imagination a t work as a mere
agen t of association which formed i mages from sense impress ions
stored i n the memo r y . Shaftesbury followed most of his contempo raries
in recognizing and accepting the imitative concept of poetry ; however ,
he did not consider it to be merely an exercise in literal copying,
not i n the manner of some . " Ti s not enough to show us merely faces ,
which may be called men 's ; every face must be a certain man 's ". 12
As i n d i c a t ed, much of what the Neoclassic critic believed
about the nature of poetry and its relation to reality emanated from
the Aristotelian concept of literature . The poet , in this context,
is a "ma k e r", endowed with powers of invention capable of giving a
llsir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art , ed. Stephen o .
Mitchell (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company , Inc . , 1965) , p . 73.
12shaftesbury , Advice to an Author , I , 132 , quoted in R. L.
Brett , The Third Earl of Shaftesbury , p. 103 .
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more complete picture of life than even nature renders, because the
poet can improve on nature , as seen in Sidney's discussion on poetic
theory in his Defence of Poetry. Likewise , Pope's reference to the
fairest form of things , to "nature methodiz 'd", strikes a keynote in
Neoclassic criticism. To " f o l l ow nature " constituted a categorical
imperative . " Une r r i ng nature" constituted that
One , clear , un chang ' d, and Universal Light ,
~~f~~c~O~~:' s::=c:e:~~y~n~~s:n~oT:~~ ~;p:~~~ 13
In this climate of opinion there is no suggestion that the poet should
attempt to portray photographic realism ; rather , his aim is to hold
t h e mirror up to " l a belle nature" . This is the sense in which we
speak of the mimetic concept of poetry: it is a concept of ' i mi t a t i on'
which found vogue in English literature after the discovery o f
Aristotle 's Poetics in the sixteenth century and which remained
central a mong the critical v iews of literary theorists we l l into the
eighteenth century .
We have recognized "new voices" being heard in this century ,
placing stress on genius and on imagination more so than o~
imitation. William Duff 's An Essay on original Gen ius (17 6 7) is one
of the many treatises written on this subject. In it he glorifies
the imaginative faculty, speaking of genius as proceeding from the
copious effusions of a plastic imagination:
Poetry , of all the liberal Arts , affords the most extensive
13Alexander Pope, " An Essay on Criticism" , in E . Audra and
Aubrey Williams , Pastoral Poetry and an Essay on Criticism (London:
Methuen & Co. Ltd . , 1961), p. 24 7 .
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scope for the display of a Genius truly Original. . . .
Smooth versification and harmonious numbers will no more
make genuine Poetry, than the atoms of a skeleton put together
can ·ma k e an animated and living figure . To produce ei ther ,
a. certai~ ~it~l spirit.musr4be infused; and in Poetry, thisV1tal Sp1r1 t 1S Lnverrt.i.on ,
It is not to be wondered at that we hear echoes in Duff of the age-old
alliance of imagination and judgment ; of imagination being subordinate
to judgment. He warns , on one occasion , that unregulated imagination
may throw· glaring colours on objects that possess no intrinsic
excellence and so mislead the mind . Duff makes a contribution to an
understanding of imagination in an age that is beginning to adopt
principles concerning the association of ideas and the development
of a notion of intuitive, sentimental or 'sympathetic ' imagination .
One may not discount these new voices being heard in the
second half of the eighteenth century, however . When one looks at
the work of William Collins , for instance , one sees sufficient
evidence of an imaginative fusion at work in him which sets him apart
from the poets of his day . Of the gifted bard , Collins writes :
Young Fancy thus to me Divinest Name ,
To whom , prepar ' d and bath' d in Heav ' n ,
The Cest of amplest Pow 'r is giv 'n ;
To few the God-like Gift assigns , 15
To gird their blest prophetic Loins . . .
14william Duff , An Essay on Original Genius (New York: Gar-
land Publishing , Inc ., 1970 ) , pp. 124-5.
15william Collins , "Ode on the Poetical Character" , ed. Edmund
Blunden, The Poems of William Collins (U.S : Folcroft Library Editions ,
1973) , p . 82 .
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In his " Od e on the Poetic Character ", Collins is quite
emphatic in his view that poetry is essentially imaginative, divine
in origin , and wild and impassioned in its method and insight. He
believes that poetry should be freely imagined and passionately felt.
Collins 's critical bent inclines him in the direction of the Romantic ,
ra ther than the Classic theory of poetry . Al though we may regard
his total output as scant , we must not overlook his influence in the
embodiment of a type of poetry that depicts a lyrical grace , and one
in which rhapsody and wonder are being made to appear essential
elements.
The fact that Collins later found favour with the Romantics
establishes him as a kindred spirit . His style is full of emotional
apostrophe. With the Wartons and Gray , Collins may be truly said
to belong to a new school of poetry, one wherein the allegory and
the sublime ode are elevated to be among the highest achievements of
the poetic imagination. In poetic personification they reign supreme
in their time , and, as Joseph Warton reminds us in The Adventurer :
It is the peculiar privilege of poetry , not only to place
material objects in the most amiable attitudes , and to
clothe them in the mo s t graceful dress , but also to give life
and motion to immaterial beings; and form , and colour , and
actions, even to abs tract ideas; to embody t h e virtues , the
vices , and the passions; and to bring before our eyes , as
on a stage , every faculty of the human mind . 16
16Joseph Warton, Adventurer (No . 57 ) in Samuel Johnson , The
Rambler and The Idler , John Hawkesworth , The Adventurer, and Mr . Town,
The Connoisseur (London: William P. Nimmo , 1877), p . 113 .
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This change which one notices in the second half of the
eighteenth century which surfaced in the works of Shaftesbury,
Thomson, Collins and others, marks a gradual yet deepening contrast
between the age of Pope and the age of Wordsworth, and testifies to an
evolving change in the concept of imagination--a change which springs
from a growing fai th in man I s instinctive, emotional nature; in what
Shaftesbury referred to as man I s "moral sense". It can be seen in the
gradual rise in importance of poetic feelings and inspirations. It
is being reflected in the gradual laying aside of traditional restraints
upon imagination in favour of a poetry which can be freely imagined
and passionately expressed.
The Faculty and Function of the Imagination
in Romantic Criticism
"One Power alone makes a Poet -1
Imagination The Divine Vision"
There could be no more complete break with the Neoclassic
tradi tion nor a more radical appraisal of the imagination than one
finds in William Blake. Although the impact of his message was a
minor one in his time, he is nevertheless a force in the revolt
against the eighteenth century's concept of reason with all of its
implications for poetry. The intellectual life of the century had
been shaped largely by Locke and Newton, whose views constituted an
affront to Blake's most deeply-held convictions about the mind of man
and the world of nature. "Newtonian science was quite acceptable to
Blake", as Northrop Frye expressed it, "as long as it dealt with the
automatism of nature as the 'floor I and not the ceiling of experience". 2
In Blake's short tracts, "There is no Natural Religion" and
"All Religions are One", he challenges Locke I s arguments. Man is
not a natural organ, subject to sense, states Blake. His desires are
not limited by his perceptions. Rather, man "perceives more than
sense (tho' ever so acute) can discover. . . The desire of man being
lWilliam Blake, "Annotations to Wordsworth's Poems" (1815),
ed. David V. Erdman, The Poetry and Prose of William Blake (3rd pr , ,
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968), p. 654.
2Northrop Frye, "Blake's Introduction to Experience", in
Northrop Frye, ed., Blake (Englewood Cliffs, N. J: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1966), p. 29. --
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Infinite the possession is Infinite & himself Infinite" . 3 Blake
insists that man 's mind is not limited to sense perceptions:
This life 's dim Windows of the Soul
Distorts the Heavens from Pole to Pole
And leads you to Believe a Lie
When you see with not thro the Eye
That was born in a night to perish in a night
When the Soul slept in the beams of Light4
Man 's mind has the power to transcend sensory experience and arrive
at the truths of his spiritual endowment. Locke 's intellectual
structure for the mind left little room for ascertaining this spiritual
meaning which, for Blake, lies behind this world of visible appearances.
The ability t o recognize this spiritual significance in the visible
universe and embody it in vision constituted for him the faculty of
the human imagination- -the endowment of the poet of genius .
Poetic genius Blake defines in this manner : he is
. . . the true Man, and . . . the body or outward form of Man
is derived from the Poetic Gen ius .
No man can think or write or speak from his heart , but he
must intend truth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The true Man is the source he being the Poetic Genius . 5
It is the poetic imagination which produces for Blake everything that
is real. Imagination is a divine power , uncovering the reality which
lies concealed behind the mask of visible objects . The familiar world
merely 'hints' at what really is; poetic genius reveals the spiritual
3William Blake, "Th e r e is No Natural Religion " , ed , David V.
Erdman , The Poetry and Prose of William Blake , pp. 1-2.
4Blake , "The Everlasting Gospels " , Poetry and Prose , p.S12 .
SBlake, "All Religions are One ", Poetry and Prose , p . 2.
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significance which remains concealed. It is the poet who has the
vision to enable us
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower
Hold Infini t.y- in the palm of6your hand
And Eternity in an hour . . .
Nature for Blake does not exist until the poetic imagination creates
it. Human imagination is that Logos , that "impregnating Word " which
brings a l l to birth . All is chaos , darkness , meaninglessness , until
the informing Word of Imagination goes forth into the deep, subduing
chaos into order, conferring reality upon it , rendering it comprehensi-
ble r bestowing upon it life itself . Imagination unifies time and space,
so that all times are ' now ' , and all spaces are ' h e r e I, as Northrop
Frye states in his v i ews on Blake . "Thus the imagination , by making
concrete and visible a hidden creative power, repeats the Incarnation" . 7
In a very real sense , one sees an apotheosis of imagination
in Blake . None of the Romantics would carry the notion of imagination
that far . In his Annotations to Berkeley 's Siris (1744) , he defines
imagination as not only the human , eternal body in every man , but also
" t h e Divine Body in Every Man" , the " a l l in Man , Th e Divine Image".8
Similarly, in his Annotations to Wordsworth 's Poems (1815) , he states :
"One Power alone makes a Poet - Imagination, The Divine Vision " . 9
6Blake, "Auguries of Innocence" , Poetry and Prose , p . 481.
7Northrop Frye , "Blake 's Introduction to Experience " , Blake, p. 26 .
8Blake , "Annotations to Berkeley 's Siris" , Poetry and Prose, p. 652.
9 "Annotations to Wordsworth 's Poems" , Poetry and Prose , p. 654.
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Imagination, in Blake I s view of poetry, is the Divine
Vision "not of The World nor of Man nor from Man as he is a Natural
Man but only as he is a Spiritual Han. Imagination has nothing to
do with Hemory" . 10 Blake makes a comparison between imagination and
memory in "A Vision of the Last Judgment", a work which he classifies
as "Yision" rather than "Fable or Allegory" which would constitute for
him a distinct and inferior kind of poetry:
Vision or Imagination is a Representation of what Eternally
Exists . Really & Unchangeably. Fable or Allegory is formed by
the daughters of Hemory. Imagination is Surrounded by the
daughters of Inspiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
This World of Imagination is the World of Eternity , it is the
Divine bosom into which we shall all go after the death of the
Vegetated body. . . There Exists . . . that Eternal World the
Permanent Reali ties of Every Thing which we see reflected in
this Vegetable Glass of Nature. 11
It is not the visible world which is Blake I s special concern;
rather , it is the invisible, eternal power behind it of which visible
things are mere symbols, and this I invisible I world draws forth his
highest powers of .i ma g i n a t i o n . Also , Blake believes that the poet is
the only true man; not only that, every man is a poet, or would be,
he states, if his vitality and creative power had not been cramped
and deadened by civilization, conventional religion , and science. Han
must, therefore, throw off all "mind-forged manacles" if he is to ful-
fill himself, in Blake I s view . He can only do this by exercising the
10 "Annotations to Wordsworth I s Poems (1815) , Poetry and Prose,
p. 655.
llBlake, "A Vision of the Last Judgment", Poetry and Prose,
pp. 544-5.
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power of imagination , the Divine Vision .
It was Blake 's belief in imagination , coupled with his
passion for freedom , his illimitable · vision , and his fascination with
the supernatural , which make him , in retrospect, a herald of the new
age, and one of the loudest voices raised in his time in favour of the
Romantic theory of Li, terary criticism. Denouncing the rationalistic
creeds which Newton and Locke held out to him , Blake exalted instead
the inward guides of energy , love, and imagination .
Blake was a visionary, not a philosopher , however.
remained for Coleridge, possessing greater powers of philosophical
analysis , to challenge in intellectual terms the theory of imagination
as understood in eighteenth-century thought , and to give fullest
expression to the theory of the poetic imagination which we now
classify as a Romantic theory.
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If then I know myself only through myself,
it is contradictory to require any other predi- 12
cate of self, but that of self-consciousness. .
Coleridge I S early speculations about the imagination arise ,
he relates in the Biographia Literaria, from first hearing Wordsworth
read his own poetry . Coleridge was then in his twenty-fourth year,
that is , in 1795/6 . He then saw a quali ty in Wordsworth I s poetry
which he recognized as differing greatly from the eighteenth-century
poets and from his contemporaries in general . This difference , as he
expresses it in the early chapters of his Biographia , which made such
an impression on his feelings and on his judgment
. . . was the union of deep feeling with profound thought; the
fine balance of truth in observing , with the imaginative
faculty in modifying the objects observed; and above all the
original gift of spreading the tone, the atmosphere , and with
it the depth and height of the ideal world around forms , inci-
dents , and situations, of which , for the common view , custom
had bedimmI~ all the lustre , had dried up the sparkle and the
dew drops.
This I excellence ' of Wordsworth in being able to give "the
charm of novelty to things of every day,,14 was one which Coleridge
no sooner felt than he sought to understand . In Chapter lV of the
Biographia Coleridge reveals that he devoted much thought to analyzing
the quality of thi s power, being convinced that it was a power higher
12samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (London: J. M.
Dent & Sons Ltd., 1934) , Ch. Xll, p. 145.
13 I b i d., Ch. lV , p. 45.
14 I b i d., Ch. XlV, p. 161.
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than that which was reflected in eighteenth century pootry as a
whole. He recognized it as the power of Imagination, a faculty
distinct from Fancy "instead of being, according to the general belief,
ei ther names with one meaning, or, at furthest, the lower and higher
degrees of one and the same power". 15
The distinction Coleridoe goes on to make between imagination
and fancy was a distinction, states Basil Willey in his book, Samuel
Taylor Coleridge, not merely between two kinds of poetry, but "an
aspect of the anti thesis between two world-views: the mechanical and
the 'dynamic', the dead and the living". 16 One might say here that
Coleridge recognized a power inherent in the workings of imagination
which were 'dynamic', 'creative', 'vitally alive', as opposed to the
Neoclassic theory of associationism. Indeed, subsequent chapters of
the Biographia (Chapters V-VII) attest to his early rejection of
the doctrine of associationism as developed from Hobbes to Hartley:
In association then consists the whole mechanism of the
reproduction of impressions, in the Aristotelian psychology.
It is the universal law of the passive fancy and mechanical
memory; that which supplie s to all other f acul ties the!,
objects, to all thought the elements of its materials.
Those years between 1796 and 1801 bear witness to a radical change
in Coleridge I s thought. From being a follower of Hartley, and a
15Biographia Literaria, Ch. IV, p. 45.
16Basil Willey, Samuel Taylor Coleridge (London: Chatto and
Windus, 1972), p. 191.
17Biographia Literaria, Ch. V, p. 54.
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materialist, he became convinced that the whole empiricist tradition
was wrong in the manner in which it conceived of the human mind and its
operations. The empiricists I perception of mental processes in terms
of matter in motion carved out a theory of min,d as being I passive I in
nature. Coleridge saw this theory of the passive mind as having its
origin in Newtonian science . In a letter to Thomas Poole in March,
1801, he denounced it:
Newton was a mere materialist . Mind, in his system , is
always passive - a lazy Looker-on on an external world. If
the mind be not passive, if it be indeed made in God's Image,
and that , too, in the sublimest sense , the Image of the
Creator , there is ground for suspicion that any system built
on the passiveness of the mind must be false , as a system. 18
Coleridge was by then convinced that "association depends in a much
greater degree on the recurrence of resembling states of feeling than
on the train of ideas". In a letter to Robert Southey , two years
later , he stated:
I almost think that ideas never recall ideas, as far as they
are ideas, any more than leaves in a fores t create each other 's
motion. The breeze it is that r~ns through them- -it is the
soul, the state of feeling. . .1
Associationism, for Coleridge , could not account for the
mental processes involved in imagination and in perception. Neither
could "matter in motion" account for our concept of nature.
18Samuel Taylor Coleridge in The Letters of Samuel Taylor
Coleridge, intr . Kathleen Raine (London: The Grey Walls Press, 1950),
~
19 Th e Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge , p , 129.
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It is in Chapters Xll-Xlll of his Biographia Literaria that
Coleridge establishes a metaphysical basis for his theory of the
imagination--the faculty which, for him , was vitally involved in every
act of human perception . The starting point, in his philosophy, is in
s e Lf-ccons c.i.o usne s s r " I AM". In other words, his basic assumption is
that intelligence is a "self-development , not a quality supervening
to a substance". 20 Th e real implication is this: The human mind ,
because it is made in the likeness of God, is truly c r e a tive . Just as
God made the world out of chaos and breathed upon it order and form ,
so does the human mind, made in His image, have the power to impart
order and form to the materials of sensory perception . The human mind
creates the world which it perceives . Between mind and nature , there
exists a vital bond.
The mind of the artist at work in imitating nature , therefore,
does not "painfully copy Nature " , but is aware that "the essence must
be mastered--the natura naturans , and this presupposes a bond between
Nature in this higher sense and the soul of man ". Coleridge continues :
. . . Dare I say that genius must act on the feeling that body
is but a striving to become mind--that it is mind, in its
essence . As in every work of art the conscio~s so impressed
on the unconscious as to a~![ear ~ it , . . . so is man the
genius that links the two.
20Biographia Literaria , Ch. Xll, p. 148 .
21Samuel Taylor Coleridge, "Poesy or Art " (1818) in Coleridge 's
Miscellaneous Criticism , ed . Thomas Middleton Raysor (Folcro~
Folcroft Press, Inc. , 1969), pp. 208-9.
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This power, and this alone , which enables man to relate the
world of mind and the world of nature is, in Coleridge I s theory ,
Imagination. In Chapter Xlll of the Biographia , he attempts to
define it:
The Imagination then I consider either as primary , or secondary .
The primary Imagination I hold to be the living power and
prime agent of all human perception , and as a repetition in the
finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I Am.
The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former,
co -existing with the conscious will , yet still as identical
wi th the primary in the Mind of its agency, and di ffering only
in degree , and in the mode"Of its operation. I t dis solves ,
diffuses , dissipates , ~rder to recreate : or where this
process is rendered impossible , yet still at all events it
:~:~g~~e:l~oo~~:~~~z~~n~b;~C~~~f~~e~1x~~ :~~e~~~~~~~ vital,
The primary Imagination, then , is involved in every act of human per-
ception. It is the creative faculty by which we create the intelligent
world as we know it . What Coleridge is saying is that the world of raw
sensation is without shape or form; any notions we perceive through the
senses of colour and texture and shape are combined into an intelligent
whole through the operation of the primary imagination. For example ,
when we look at a tree , we do not have separate sensations of colour and
shape and immediately involve ourselves in a discursive act to arrive at
the knowledge of "tree". Rather, when we apprehend "tree", we have
recreated a mental entity or mental reality out of the discrete sensa-
tions of experience. When we can say , "tree" , we have already exer-
cised the primary Imagination , in Coleridge's view of things.
22Biographia Literaria , Ch. Xlll, pp. 159-60.
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Through the interaction of subject and object, owing to that
close bond which Coleridge sees to exist between mind and nature , the
primary Imagination gives us--The World. Imagination is the Logos;
it imitates the creativeness of God. Man is in a sense, a miniature
creator because in God man has his being .
To a mind that has no faculty of imagination in Coleridge I s
view , all would remain chaotic; meaningless in shape and colour. It is
the primary Imagination which bestows order and shape . (Th e infant ,
in a s .ense , creates his world).
The secondary Imagination , in Coleridge I s theory, is none other
than the ' po e t i c ' imagination, which takes the creative perceptions of
the primary Imagination and "dissolves , diffuses and dissipates" them ,
in order to "r e c r e a t e ". Like the primary , the secondary Imagination is
a creative faculty; as Coleridge states , it is "e s s e n t i a l l y vital ",
ope.rat.Lnq in a manner that confers new life , shape and unity on the
flux of everyday images . It gives the " ch a rm of novelty to things of
every day". 23 In its activity , this poetic Imagination modifies
objects by "r e du c i ng multitude to unity" by transferring to them a
human and intellectual life from the poet I sown spirit; by struggling ,
as Coleridge expresses it, "to idealize and to un ify " . What is implied
here is that the poet creates reality . He attempts to show us what
is really real. Poetry, then , if truly imagination, is truth-bearing.
23Biographia Literaria, Ch. XlV, p . 161.
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The basis of such a claim lies in the fact that the secondary Imagina-
tion is an echo of the primary, and because the primary rev e a l s what is
true, it follows that the secondary or poetic Imagination recreates
that which is equally true. On this Coleridge builds his whole concept
of poetry.
One must recognize , at this point , that in Coleridge's theory,
• feelings ' are an important inherent quality of the poetic imagination .
It was the "synthesis of thought and feeling" which first drew him
toward an analysis of the power behind Wordsworth ' s poetic excellence.
He addressed himself to this point in a letter to Richard Sharp in
1804:
. . . Wordsworth is a poet, a most original poet . . .
He is himself and , I dare affirm that, he will hereafter be
admi tted as the first and greatest philosophical poet , the
only man who has effected a complete and constant synthesis
of thought and feeling and combined them with poetic forms ,
with the music of pleasurable passion.. . 24
Coleridge' s conviction about the importance of feeling had been
voiced three years earlier in a letter to Thomas Poole :
My opinion is thus: that deep thinking is attainable only
by a man of deep feeling , and that all truth is a species
of revelation. The more I understand of Sir Isaac Newton ' s
works , the more boldly I dare utter to my own mind, and there-
fore to you , that I believe the souls of five hundred Isaac
Newtons would go to the making up of a Shakespeare or a
Milton... 25
24 Th e Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge , p. 142.
25 I b i d ., p. 108.
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Coleridge's philosophy and poetry are closely related. "No
man was ever a great poet without being at the same time a profound
philosopher", he states, "for poetry is the blossom and fragrance of
all human knowledge, human thought, passions, emotions, and language".
His comments on "The Education of Children" highlight his belief that
the human imagination has been bestowed on mankind by a benevolent
Providence as a means to human betterment:
In the imagination of man exist the seeds of all moral and
scientific improvement . . . The imagination is the distinguish-
ing characteristic of man as a progressive being ; and I repeat
that it ought to be carefully guided and strengthened as the
indispensable m~~ns and instrument of continued amelioration
and refinement .
Coleridge speaks about the imagination in its most comprehen-
sive sense , extending its range to embrace , not only the poetic
faculty , but the initiatives of philosophy as well. The ultimate
object of poetry and philosophy he sees as being the same: the trans-
mission and dramatization of I truth I. A poet must indeed be a profound
metaphysician, possessing an "active, self-forming , self-realizing
mind" (a theory which offers striking contrast to that perceived by
Locke ). In Coleridge I s theory of mind there is need for the development
of the inner sense :
One man 's consciousness extends only to the pleasant or
unpleasant sensations caused in him by external impressions;
another enlarges his inner sense to a conscious.ness of forms
26samuel Taylor Coleridge , "The Education of Children" , in
Coleridge 's Miscellaneous Criticism, ed. Thomas Middleton Raysor
(Folcroft , P .A: The Folcroft Press, Inc ., 1969) , p . 195 .
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and quantity; a third in addi tion to the image is conscious
of the conception or notion of the thing; a fourth attains
to a notion of his notions . . . he reflects on his own
~~=l:~:i~::~e:~=st:~;ew: r m~~s:arn~~=h~~~s~~P~~~~i~~~, o~~:=. 27
What are the implications of these remarks on the 'inner
sense ' for poetry? They are these: the poet must be more than
'merely aware'. He must be ' a t one' with the object of his perceptions.
He must bring about a "coalescence", as Coleridge expresses it, between
himself and the object he perceives .
How does the poet, one may ask, develop these powers of
imagination which will effect this coalescence? Coleridge would say:
by di scovering the powers of "gr owt h and production". In The
Statesman 's Manual he speaks of this power as he knows it operating
within himself:
. . . I feel an awe , as there were before my eyes the same
power as that of the reason--the same power in a lower dignity ,
and therefore a symboI established in the truth of things.
I feel it alike, whether I contemplate a single tree or flower,
or meditate on vegetation throughout the world , as one of the
great organs of the life of nature. Lo ! with the rising sun
it commences its outward life and enters into open communion
with all the elements, at once assimilating them to itself
and to each other. . . Lo ~ how upholding the ceaseless
plastic motions of the parts in the profoundest rest of the
whole it becomes the visible organismus of the entire silent
or elementary life of nature.m--
27Biographia Literaria, Ch. Xll, p. 135.
28coleridge , The Statesman 's Manual, Appendix B , quoted in
I. A. Richard , Coleridge on Imagination (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul Ltd., 1950), pp. 52-53.
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One sees from Coleridge I s theory that the powers of the human mind,
both in perceiving and in shaping, are the powers of imagination . In
exercis ing these powers, the poet "d i f f u s e s a tone and spirit of unity ,
that blends and (as it were) fuses each into each , by that synthetic
and mag ical po wer of i magination ". 29 Nothing is static or fixed in
this process. The uni ty which is achieved is an organic unity . Just
as a plant assimilates diverse elements of earth and air , so too does
t h e I synthe t ic ' po wer of i mag i nation reconcile oppos i te or discordant
qualities , states Coleridge . And just as the various parts of the
growing plant achieve an inter-relation , one part with the other ,
t o become a l ivi ng who le , so a lso does a p o em ach ieve o r ga n i c uni t y
when its various parts are inter-related in and through the unifying
process of im agination . It is in this reconciliation of diverse
e lements , a characterist ic achievement o f the poet o f genius , that
Shakespeare 's plays drew forth Coleridge 's great praise. [Shakespeare]
possessed the power of "reducing multitude into uni ty of effect " ,
he sta tes . Among diverse elements he achieved reconciliation :
Possessed by the spirit , not possessing it . . . Sh akespeare
first studied patiently , med itated deeply , understood mi n u t e l y,
t ill know ledge , become habitua l and intui tive , wedded i t s e l f to
his habitual feelings , and at length gave bir th t o that
stupendous power , by whi~8 he stands alone , with no equal or
second in his class. . .
29Biographia Literaria , Ch . XlV , p . 166 .
30 I b i d . , XV, 172 .
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The foregoing illustration reinforces Coleridge's expressed
views (in Chapter XV of the Biographia) that images, "however beautiful,
though faithfully copied from nature, and as accurately represented in
words, do not of themselves characterize the poet". 31 Images must be
modified by a predominant passion . A human and intellectual life must
somehow be imparted to those images from the poet 's own spirit , in
the manner in which Shakespeare, out of the power of his mind, created
his characters . They were drawn , observes Coleridge , not from
"mere observation ", but from "me d i t a t i on ".
This is the sense, then, in which one understands Coleridge 's
analogy of organic growth with reference to the i maginative process.
It is a process which shapes a poem from wi thin . In this process ,
there is no room for mention of "de co r um of parts", a real concern of
Neoclassic poetic thought . One recalls Dryden 1 s translation of
Boileau, wherein Dryden spoke of the necessity of each object being
fixed in due place , because he considered that a perfect whole is
achieved only by joining all the pieces . The un i t y which Coleridge
is postulating is an organic unity. The various parts of a poem are
brought together in living relationship. The process is a self-evolv-
ing one; it is not a unity imposed from without - -such would constitute
for him a mechanical process. Rather , poetic initiative must come from
"within " .
31Biographia Literaria, XV, 169 .
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It would be comparatively easy , says Coleridge, for a poet
to go about the world wi th notebook in hand, carefully jotting down
sights and sounds. With practice , such a poet might acquire a con-
siderable facility in representing his observations. But this is not
the observation of a ' mi nd ' . Nature can only confirm our observations;
it is the mind that generates them. The unconscious mind is the most
highly significant region , the most mysterious source which the poet
must tap .
It is this power which Coleridge observed in Sir Joshua
Reynold 's poetry , a work which he praised in 1819, using its merits to
voice his reaction against the mechanism implicit in some of the major
poetry of his time:
I am happy to see and feel that men are craving for a better diet
than the wretched trash they have been fed with for the last
century; that they will be taught that which is sound must come
out of themselves , and that they cannot find good with their eyes
or with their ears or with their hands, that they will not dis-
cover them in the crucible or bring them out of a machine, but
must look into the living soul which God has made His image, in
order to learn , even in fragments , what that power is by which2
we are to execute the delegated power entrusted to us by Him. 3
This "very living soul which God has made His image" is the power of
imagination from which the poet projects passion and life into the
inanimate world and transforms it. This transforming power Coleridge
recognizes as the same as that of reason.
32Quoted by J. R. De J . Jackman in Method and Imagination in
Coleridge's Criticism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1969), p. 88.
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In eighteenth-century critical theory , it was thought that the
perceiving mind reflected the external world. Imagination consisted
in the presenting of selected and ordered images of life. In Coleridge
one sees a reversal. He offers a theory of imagination which is
analogous with the highest workings of t h e human mind : an imagination
which is both living and growing , generating and producing its own
form; one whose rules are not those of the Neoclassical r ules of
invention , but rather the rules of growth and production.
One might wonder about the motivating forces which inspired
Coleridge with the desire to redefine the concept of the poetic imagina-
tion , and to s uch an extent. Abrams , in his book , The Mirror and the
~' regards Coleridge 's objectives to be an essential part of the
nineteenth century critic I s attempt to revitalize the material and
mechanical universe which had emerged from the philosophy of Descartes
and Hobbes. Abrams says that it was Coleridge I s attempt
. to overcome the sense of man's alienation from the world
by healing the cleavage between subject and object, between the
vital, purposeful , value-filled world of private experience
and the dead postulated world of extension , quantity, and motion .
To establish that man shares his own life with nature was to
reanimate the dead universe of the materialists , and at the 33
same time most effectively to tie man back into his milieu.
Coleridge seems to have seen the need to emphasize the spiritual
dimension , as a counter-reaction to the sensationalist view of an ex-
ternal world, as Abrams suggests. From his own intense sense of the
33Meyer H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (New York : Oxford
University Press, 1953) , p. 218.
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"inner life " came his belief that imagination , working with intuition ,
is more likely than is the analytical reason to discover the mysteries
of spiritual reality .
In Coleridge I s doctrine of the imagination , one finds philo-
sophical background for the Romantic 's unshaken conviction that poets,
in the words of Shelley , " a r e the unacknowledged legislators of the
world " .34 His explication of the nature and function of the imaginative
faculty undoubtedly forms the ideological foundation of Romantic poetry.
34percy Bysshe Shelley, "A Defence of Poetry", a n Shelley I s
Poetry and Prose , ed . , Donald H. Reiman (New York: w. W. Norton &
Company , Inc. , 1977), p . 508.
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I had been taught to reverence a Power
That is the v e r y q ua lity and shape
And image of right reason. . .35
Wordsworth does not give a precise disquisition on the subject
of the i maginat ion , as does Coleridge . Wordsworth 's concept is almost
religious , when compared with the more philosophical and psychological
views held by Coleridge . In most respects , h owev e r, both writers ' views
run along similar lines . With much that Coleridge says about the faculty
of imagination Wordsworth finds agreement , especially wi th Coleridge 's
distinction between imagination and fancy . However , Wordsworth makes no
distinction between primary and secondary imagination as does Coleridge.
Imagination for Wordsworth is the most important gift a poet
can possess. It is the faculty which enables h im , out of h is everyday
experiences, to see and to create . At times he refers to it as "vision " ,
the insight into the real world which the senses, of themselves , are
incapable of apprehending. Like Coleridge, he views its activi ty as
that of a God -like process . At work even in the smallest child , it
operates in a manner that enables him to create his own world :
For feeling has to him imparted strength ,
And powerful in all sentiments of grief ,
Of exultation , fear , and joy , his mi n d
Even as an agent of the one great mind,
Creates , Creator, and receiver both
:~:~~ny~ ~~~o~~s~l~i~~ge with the wo r k s
35william Wordsworth , The Prelude (1805), ed. Ernest De Selin-
(London : Oxford university Press, 1933), Bk . XII , 24-26 .
36 Xb i d. , II , 269 -75.
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I magination grows to maturity wi thin the poet , making him what he is.
Accompanied by special insights, it enables him to create--to see into
the very life of things . It is, says Wordsworth in his autobiographi-
cal poem , The Prelude:
. . . but another name for absolute strength
And clearest insight, amplitude of mind ,
And reason in her most exalted mood. 37
The rational mind is being endowed here with a new dimension .
It is being understood as capable of inspired insights . Wordsworth is
not relegating reason to an inferior position; for him , inspired
insight is itself rational. His view of the reason as an intuitive
faculty constitutes "reason in her most exalted mo o d", that inner light
. when the light of sense
Goes . ou~ ~n flashes that3gave shown to usThe Lnv i.s i.b Le world . . .
He recognizes that reason alone is incapable of enabling man to
grasp the highest kind of truth. Reason needs the stimulus of
"young imagination" . For Wordsworth it is the imagination and feeling
combined with reason that " f o rw a r d reason 's all too scrupulous march " .
Or , as he writes elsewhere: imagination is that sacred power assigned
37 Th e Prelude (1805), Xlll , 168-70 .
38 I b i d . , VI , 534-36.
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to "elevate the .mo r e than reasoning Mind". 39
Equally importan t in Wordsworth I s theory of the imagination
are feelings which work with imagination to "energize" the r eason.
Feelings are as necessary to reason as is the imagination. Without
imaginative feelings, the practical understanding is of little avail.
The important role which he gives to the feelings can be seen in
his. Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800) wherein he offers what h e be-
lieves to be the difference between his poems and those of his day.
The di fference, h e states , is this: " . .. it i s the f e eling therein
developed which gives importance to the action and situation, and
not the action and situation to the feeling" . 40
Wordsworth states as his objective in Lyrical Ballads to
keep his reader "in the company of flesh and blood". In doing so he
portrays what he believes to be the poet 's aim , namely , " t o bring his
feelings near to those of the persons whose feelings he describes" ,
even to "confound and identify his own feelings with theirs.,,4l
He bears witness in The Prelude to the fact that his own growth
in wisdom occurred only when his head ceased to dominate his heart;
when he began to embrace "those sweet counsels between head and heart"
from whence genuine knowledge proceeds. The passions and feeling s
are what vitalize the reason , endowing the poet with inspired insights
39wordsworth, "Miscellaneous Sonnets", in The Poetical Works
of William Wordsworth, e d s . E. de Selincourt and Helen Darbishire
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), Sonnet XXXV , Vol. 3 , p. 20.
40wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800) , in The Prose
Works of William Wordsworth, e d s . W. J. B . Owen and Jane Worthington
Smys er (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), Vol. I, p. 130.
41 I b i d., p. 128.
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into a wo r l d which the senses alone are incapable of discovering.
Wordsworth is thus leading the reaction in his time of "feeling"
against " f a n c y". From a concept of poetry as mimesis, he renders one
of expression- -the impassioned product of the poet 's mind and heart ;
one in which he sees t he visible wor ld with the fresh wonder of the
child and with the mature understanding of the adult, as his poem
The Prel ude relates .
Th e experience of such fee l i ng i n the poet I s wo r k p resupposes
a l ike p ower of sens ibility in his reader. Wo r d s wo r t h alerts his
reader to this response in his Pre f ace to Ly r i c a l Ballads (1 80 0) :
I have one request to make of my Reader , which is , that in
judging these Poems he would decide by his own feelings
genuinely , and not by the reflection upon which wi l l probably
be the judgment of others . 42
Elsewhere, in his Essay Supplementary to the Preface (Poems , 1815 ) , in
commenting on " t a s t e ", he writes:
. . . without the exertion of a co -operating power in the mind
of the reader, there can be no adequate sympa~ . . wi thout
this auxiliary impulse , elevated or profound , passion cannot
exist . 4 3
I n his aim to restore the vi tal bond which mu s t exist between
a poet 's heart and voice , Wordsworth , in his Preface to Lyrical Ballads ,
emphasizes the necessity for the poet I s adoption of a language of feeling
42wordsworth , Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800) , in The Prose
Works of William Wordsworth , Vol. I, p . 154 .
4 3wordsworth , "Essay Supplementary to Preface " (1815), in
Wordsworth's Literary Criticism , ed . Nowell C. Smith (London : The
Folcroft Press Inc ., 1970), p . 197.
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rather than versified expression unsupported by a human emo t ion a l
response. In explaining his own style in Lyrical Ballads he writes:
. . in these Poems I propose to myself to imitate, and
as far as is possible, to adopt the very language of men .
. . . I wish to keep my Reader in the company of flesh and
blood, p ersuaded that by doing so I shall interest him...
There will be found in these volumes little of what is usually
called poetic diction: I have taken much pains to avoid it
as others ordinarily take to produce it; this I have done for
the reason already alleged, to bring my language near to the
language of men. . .44
In the Appendix to the Preface, he iterates his claim for a genuine
language of poetry r e lating to common life, and gives from among
various poets examples wherein "the language of passion [ was] wrested
from its proper use". 45
A commonly accepted belief among eighteenth-century poets was
that language must be the dres s of thought. Wordsworth is d emanding of
language much more. The analogy is not "what the garb is to the body
but what the body is to the soul". 46 "If words . . . b e not an in-
c a r n a t i o n of the thoughts but only a clothing for it", Wordsworth states,
"then surely they prove an ill gift". For him, words hold, above all
e x t e r n a l p owe r s , a dominion ov er thoughts. Words constitute "the
mediurn through which, in poetry, the heart is to be affected". 47
44preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800), Th e Prose Works, Vol. 1,
p. 150.
45Appendix to Pre f a ce to Lyrical Ballads, Th e Prose ~vorks, I, 164.
46"Essay up on Ep i t a p h s " , III, The Prose Works, II, 84.
47 "Essay Supplementary t o the Preface" (1815), Th e Prose Works,
III, 82.
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Wordsworth demands of poetry a vital union b etwe en thought ,
feeling , and expression , and it is this union which h e a ccomplishes
in his own poetic works , as r eflected particularly in the c onc l u d i ng
book of The Prelude . A striking example i s hi s de s cription of the
peak of Mount Snowdon one warm , misty , summer 's night . As h e relates ,
the moon stood naked in the heavens ; the headland waters roared in
t h e distance . Nature see med to transform everything in the spell of
the moment. The mist seemed to become " a silent s ea " ; the hills up -
heaved "d u s ky backs " ; the Atlantic dwindled , "a p p e a r i n g to give up
its Majes ty " . And on all t h i s, the moon looked do wn in single glory .
Later, in silent meditation upon the scene long after it had passed ,
Wordsworth s tate s that it became for him " Th e p erfect image of a
mighty Mind/ Of on e that feeds upon infinity". 48
In other words, there i s a power , which nature thrusts forth
upon the senses , a pow er which is the v ery counterpart of inspired
reason . Through the workings of this imaginative pow er , the poet i s
able to "hold communion with the invisible world" . 49 In this union,
the boundaries of individual limits are dissolved and an imaginative
unification of subj e ct and obj e ct e n s u e s . Of such minds , he wri t es ,
they are truly
. . . from the Deity
For they are Powers , and h en ce the highest bliss
4 8Th e Prelude (1 805) , Bk . Xl ll , p p . 69-70 .
49 I b i d . , 105.
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That can be known is. theirs, the consciousness
Of whom they are habitually infused
Through every image , and through every thought,
And all impressions-. . .50
In The Prelude, as well as in his other poems, one is made increasingly
aware of the intimate relationship which he sees to exist between man
and nature . His belief is that in nature, man finds the perfect model
for his own creative acts . The Prelude never ceases to emphasize this
important link: poetry and nature are inseparably bound . Nature , in
effect , infuses poetry with passion. This is the energy, springing
as it does from nature, which Wordsworth believes a poet should
incorporate into his works .
One cannot help but notice the constant reference to imagination's
being a "power" in Wordsworth I s criticism. The constant reference to
imaginative power implies that the creative mind is an active agent,
operating on matter and transforming it. Such a concept of mind is in
opposition to the views of many major theorists in the eighteenth
century who held the view that the imagination produced images, that is,
ideas of sense impressions faithfully remembered. Those views could well
be represented in the statement of William Taylor in his English Synonyms
Discriminated (1813) wherein he stated that imagination "is the power
of depicting" by which a man " c a n distinctly copy in ideas the impression
of sense". Imagination in this context as held by Taylor and by the
SOThe Prelude (1805), Bk. Xlll, 106-111.
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majority of Neoclassic critics , would constitute for Wordsworth
nothing mo r e than a mode of memory'. In his theory, the active opera-
tion of the creative mind is paramount :
Imagination.. . has no reference to images that are merely a
faithful copy , existing in t he mind , of absent external objects;
but is a word of higher import, denoting operations of the
mind upon those objects, and processes of creation or of
compos ition , governed by certain fixed laws . 51
Observation must be charged with feeling, in other words.
From this source the creative energy emanates. A poet I s experience
wi th natural phenomena must be vitalized by a personal response to
such phenomena ; the eye and the heart mus t interact . On thi s principle,
Wordsworth's concept of imagination rests:
. . now all eye
And now all ear; but ever with the heart 52
Employ 'd, and the majestic intellect . ..
Analogous to this perfect balance between mind and heart, there
exists a corresponding balance between the mind of man and nature , a
correspondence which permeates his poetic theory. He sees nature as
the beneficient giver of "that energy by which truth is seen" . It is
charged with passion and with life . In the presence of nature , Words-
worth stands , a sensitive , creative soul . In her endless variety he
perceives "a motion and a spirit that impels All thinking things, all
objects of all thought/ And rolls through all things . . . 5 3
51 "Preface to the Edition of 1815 " , in The Prose Works, III, 30-31.
52 The Prelude (1805), Xl , 143-45.
53"Tintern Abbey " , in The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth,
ed. Ernest De Selincourt (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1944), Vol. II , p . 262.
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It is these qualities of nature, namely , her power, passion
and harmony', which become for Wordsworth the very features of the
human imagination . Just as nature is capable of transformation , as if
acted upon by some "mighty Mind" , so also the poet, by the power of
inspired insight which is none other than " r e a s on in her most exalted
mood " , invests what he sees and feels with a substance and a life , and
at the same time fuses elements of the most different nature together
into one harmonious whole . This latter quality , namely , the vital uni ty
which he perceives in the natural world , occupies an important link with
the yearning in the mind of the poet for transcendent unity . Wordsworth
believes that just as in nature nothing is defined into " ab s o l u t e
independent singleness" , so also in the creative act of i maginative
transformation, a unification occurs . This is the unifying process which
characterizes many of Wordsworth 's own poems . It is this fusion of
substances which is at the heart of the unifying action in his whole
concept of the poetic imagination.
Another feature of the imaginative process in his criticism
centers in his belief that man can arrive , through the contemplation of
natural objects, at eternal , universal truths. We may recall that the
eighteenth-century empirical tradi tion which Wordsworth inherited was
wont to regard poetry as an " i nge n i o u s lie" , to borrow Bonhour 's
phrase. The poetic ideal was ' i mi t a t i on' . In Wordsworthian poetry, we
recognize a new dimension: there is a truth, not of science, but of
the imagination:
The Man of science seeks truth as a remote and unknown
benefactor; he cherishes and loves it in solitude: the Poet ,
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singing a song in which all hu man beings join with him ,
reOjoicesin the presence of truth as our visible friend and
hourly companion . 54
The poet is a prophet of truth . Poet and prophet become
connected in a mighty scheme of truth , each perceiving something never
seen before . Inspired by a sense of my s t e r y and possessed of a deeper
insight than mo s t men , the poet probes into the very nature of things in
order to discover me a n i n g s h idden from ordinary intel ligence . Such
probings go f a r beyond t hat of p hysical objects ; they explore t he
inner world of spirit .
Similar views of the poet I s prophetic role are shared by Shelley ,
whose A Defence of poetry constitutes one of the clearest statements of
Romantic poetic theory . For Shelley , the poet
. . . not only beholds intensely the present as it is , and dis-
covers those laws according to which present things ought to be
ordered , but he beholds the future in the present , and his
thoughts are the germs of the flower and the fruit of latest
time . Not that I assert poets to be prophets , in the gross sense
of the word , or that they can foretell the form as s urely as they
foreknow the spirit of events : such is the pretense of super-
stition which would make poetry an attribute of prophecy ,
~:;:::st~;nt;:o~~:~~a~~ :~:r~~~~~i~= , p~~~r~he .; p~e~5~arti-
54preface to Lyrical Ballads (1 8 50 ), The Prose Works of William
Wordsworth , Vol. I , p . 141.
55shelley , A Defence of Poetry , in Shelley 's Poetry and Prose ,
pp . 482-3 .
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Because poetry is for Shelley "the expression of the Imagina-
tion" , it becomes "the very image of life in its eternal truth ". 56
He proceeds to describe it as "the light of life; the source of what-
ever of beautiful, or 9'enerous , or true can have place in an evil
time ".57
Central to Shelley I s theory is his belief that 'love I is
all; and that it is the imagination which enables man to transcend
his own nature in order to identify with the beautiful and the good .
He exacts of the poet an intense and comprehensive imagination so that
he may bet.ter put himself in the place of others so that their
pleasures and pains "become his own " , because poetry , indeed, is
the "g r e a t instrument of moral good ".
Shelley makes a sharper distinction between imagination and
reason than does Wordsworth. for whom im agination became "r e a s o n in
her most exalted mood" . Shelley sees reason as somewhat on a lower
plane : " Re a s on is to Imagination as the instrument to the agent , as
the body to the spiri t , as the shadow to the substance". 58 Reason, in
contradistinction to Wordsworth , acts as an instrument for the
imagination . It is an instrument of analysis , whereas imagination is
the instrument of synthesis. Poetry , then , is not subject to the
control of the active powers of the mind , states Shelley:
. . . A man cannot say , " I will compose poetry ". The greatest
56shelley , A Defence of Poetry, p. 485 .
57 I b i d ., p . 493 .
58 I b i d . , p . 480.
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poet e ven cannot say it : for the mind in creation is as
a fading coal wh i c h some invi sible influence, like an
inconstant wind , awakens to transitory brightness: this
power arises from within, like the colour of a flower which
fades and changes as it is developed , and the conscious por-
tions Of our natures are unprophetic either of its approach or
its departure. 59
Al though Shelley I s mind moves in a way unlike the other Romantic
poets , he attaches as great an importance to the poetic imagination ,
which possesses for him , as it does for Coleridge and Wordsworth, the
power " t o create anew the universe a fter i t has been annihilated in our
minds by the recurrence of impressions blunted by iteration " .60 This
is none other than the q ua l ity Coleridge highlights in Wordsworth ' s
poetry, that of giving " t he charm of novelty to the things of every
day ".
Shelley makes a distinction between the philosopher and the
poet when he says that "Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of
the world " , t he "mi r r o r s of the gigantic shadows wh i c h futurity casts
upon the present . . . ,,61 Such assertion confirms Shelley 's belief in
the power and ability of poetic intuition to point the direction in
which the world is moving. "Wh a t were Virtue, Love , Patriotism,
Friendship. . . if Poetry did not ascend to bring light and fire from
these eternal regions where the owl-winged faculty of calculation
dare not ever soar . . . ..6 2
One sees the Romantic poets running counter to their predecessors;
standing opposed to a poetry that acts as a vehicle for discursive
59 A Defence of Poetry pp. 503-4.
60 I b i d . , pp. 505-6.
61 I b i d . , p . 508.
62 I b i d. , p . 503.
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reasoning. More in the spirit of the English Platonists, they stand
firm on . the side of Godlike insight and direct, intuitive appre-
hension, looking with disdain on those who are fed, as they see it,
by the letter rather than by the spirit of things.
In Wordsworth I s theory, reason alone is not enough; it must
be supported by imagination and energized by feeling in its search
for truth. Of itself,
Our meddling intellect
Mis shapes the beauteog~ form of things:-
We murder to dissect.
An aspect one must not overlook in Wordsworth I s theory which
brings him in line with the empiricist tradition which he inherited,
is the important role the senses play in his poetic theory. Wordsworth
believes that poetry must begin with careful observation of the visible
world. In this respect he has been anticipated by such poets as James
Thomson and Joseph Warton, but none more than Wordsworth were so
consistently preoccupied with exploiting the world of sensory
perception. In this connection, Wordsworth himself remarked of the
poetry between the publication of Paradise Lost and The Seasons that
. . . it does not contain a single new image of external
nature; and scarcely presents a familiar one from which it
can be inferred that the eye of the Poet had been steadily
fixed upon his subject, much less that his feelings had 64
urged him to work upon it in the spirit of genuine imagination.
63wordsworth, "The Tables Turned", in William Wordsworth
Selected Poems and Prefaces, ed., Jack Stillinger (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 107.
64wordsworth, "Essay, Supplementary to the Preface" (1815),
The Prose Works, Vol. Ill, p . 73.
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Observation alone is not enough. Wordsworth believes that poetry
demands a receptive heart, as well as an observant eye. The poet
must indeed observe , but he must infuse these observations with his
own feelings. It is feelings, not observation alone, which constitute
.f o r Wordsworth the true begetter of poetry . It is observation vitalized
by the power of emotional response, on this his theory of imagination rests .
One sees in the Romantic concept a theory of imagination that is
strikingly different from that of Augustan mentality, and yet, having
certain s imilarities with the empiricist tradition. For instance, Words-
worth believes, even more so than did the Augustans , that poetry imi tates
nature. In Wordsworth's belief , though, this imitation is not of a nature
fixed and static; it is the imitation of a dynamic nature, infused with
the ;feelings and emotions of the poet I s own mind . To the known and
familiar landscape , as a result, the Romantic brings a fresh perspective.
To the ordinary events of every day he gives " t h e charm of novelty"--
the fashioning of his own creative power. This, then , is the quality
which, one may conclude, characterizes Romantic poetry, this very
quality which Coleridge himself recognized in Wordsworth as being a dis -
tinguishing quality among the poets of their day , this
union of deep feeling with profound thought; the fine balance
of truth in observing, with the imaginative faculty in
modifying the objects observed; and above all, the original
gift of spreading the tone , the atmosphere , and with it the
depth and height of the ideal world around forms, incidents ,
and situa tions , of which, for the common view, custom had
bedimmed all the lustre, had dried up the sparkle and the dew
drops. 65
65coleridge, BiographiaLiteraria, Ch. lV , p. 45.
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It was the seventeenth century that gave literary theory
psychological direction. In the views of Hobbes and Locke, concepts
of the human mind and of t he poetic imagination were analyzed, and
their applications were to have far-reaching effects on the development
of poetic theory. In this climate of strict empiricism , wherein all
knowledge derives from sensory experience, the f a c u l t y of imagination
came to serve a rhetorical rather than a logical purpose.
Against Hobbes I s empiricism , the English Platonists sought to
develop an idealist philosophy which envisioned the mind as an active
agent. These writers stressed that man I s reason is innate , not a mere
product of sensory experience . Although they were not particularly
i n t e r e s t e d in aesthetics , the English Platonists exercised an
influence on men like Shaftesbury and Akenside , who came to believe
that the poet was somewhat like a divine Maker, "a just Prometheus
under Jove " . This active principle which writers like Shaftesbury
ascr ibed to the poet I s mind heralded what we now refer to as the
Romantic concept of imagination.
Although the view of imagination conceived of by Romantic poets
and critics may appear to be revolutionary in nature , it had been pre-
pared for in many respects. Intimations of this concept occurred
throughout the history of literary criticism whenever there evolved
poetic criteria that were " s u b j e c t i v e" rather than exclusively "o b j e c t i ve "
in value ; whenever literary criticism made room for ma n I s feelings and
emotions as sources of poetic power; whenever the restraint on imagination
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was placed aside in favour of a poetry that could be freely imagined
and passionately felt; whenever the imaginative faculty ceased to
opera te as a I picture-:naking , one and became an ' o r g a n of truth I •
Al though literary movements in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries depict a gradual acceleration in i magination 's importance
in poetic composition , the notion of this faculty , as perceived by
the major Romantic critics and poets , is in many respects entirely
new. Nowhere in the h i s t o r y of literary criticism does one witness
such desire on the part of poets to project , from their own minds ,
passion and life into the universe and to share so intimately with
nature . Nowhere does one observe so obviously that the poet considers
himself to be the unifying center of this un iverse , having intuitive
insights into reality.
In imagination , the Romantic poets believed their creative
powers resided . To curb the imagination would be to deny something
innate to their who le being. It would be to curb the mi nd' s mo s t
vital faculty- -that " l i v i n g power and prime agent of all human
perception ",
One must conclude that with the emergence of Blake , Wordsworth ,
Coleridge , Shelley , and others, the faculty and function of imagination
in literary theory assumed major proportions . For the first time ,
its nature and function were given a literary base .
With the Romantics , there emerged a type of poetry that was
completely new. Writing from a heightened consciousness of their own
powers , a group of poets emerged who set out to fashion new worlds out
of their own minds, and they believed them to be valid worlds . They
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also believed that in exercising those imaginative powers, they created
life and added to the sum of living experience . Not wishing to be
passive observers in a world which they believed to be in a constant
process of creation, they made themselves into active agents, and
endeavoured to convince men of the invisible reality which lay concealed
behind the visible scene.
M. Bowr a relates in his book , The Romantic Imagination,
these poets :
far from thinking that the imagination deals wi th the
non-existent, .. . insist that it reveals an important kind
of truth. They believe that when it is at work it sees
things to which the ordinary intel ligence is b lind and that it
is intimately connected with a special insight or perception
or intuition. Indeed, imagination and insight are in fact
inseparable and form for all practical purposes a single
faculty . Insight both awakes the imagination to work and is
in t u r n sharpened by it when it is at work. This is the
assumption on which the Romantics wrote poetry. It means that,
when their creative gifts are engaged, they are inspired by
their sense of the mystery of things to probe it with a peculiar
insight and to shape their discoveries into imaginative forms . .
They combine imagination and truth because the~~ creations are
inspired and controlled by a peculiar insight .
The Romantics believed that their business was to create--
to create anew the universe , in the words of Shelley , after it has been
annihilated in our minds by the recurrence of impressions blunted by
iteration. To do this , they were convinced that reason was not enough.
It needed "young imagination " to forward reason 's "e l s e too scrupulous
march " .
66 C. M. Bowra, The Romantic Imagination (New York: Oxford Uni -
versity Press, 1961), p. 7.
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